U.S. Presence and Posture in a Post-Epic Fury Middle East

On January 8, 1.5 million protestors took to the streets in Tehran alongside millions more in 200 other Iranian cities.¹ They blamed Iran’s deepening economic crisis on the Islamic Republic’s leadership and chanted “death to the dictator.”² It was the largest uprising in Iran since the 1979 revolution. The regime responded by killing over 36,000 of its own citizens in just two days.³ 

Days later on January 13, President Trump told Iranians to keep protesting and that “help is on its way.”⁴ Yet help was far away. The nearest aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln battlegroup, was on deployment in the Indo-Pacific. By the time the Lincoln arrived in CENTCOM waters two weeks later, brutal crackdowns accompanied by internet blackouts and martial law drove protestors off the streets.⁵ It was a tragic example of how the United States failed to deter, as insufficient force presence in the region forced the United States to react to events instead of shaping them. While some suggest the United States can withdraw forces from the Middle East, a more realistic view is that those who wish away U.S. force presence invite instability. Every president since Nixon has dealt with instability in the Middle East and called upon the U.S. military to stabilize the region. 

Operation Epic Fury has made the Iranian regime weaker, but cementing this into long-term strategic success will paradoxically place a persistent burden on conventional U.S. force presence in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic is likely to remain a feature of regional geopolitics, and maintaining peace will require sustaining American strength in the region. The United States should organize its post-Epic Fury force posture to achieve three goals: keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, preventing Iranian reconstitution of its nuclear and missile programs and proxy networks, and supporting our allies’ rearmament and reconstruction.   

Force Posture 

First, prevent Iranian veto over the Strait of Hormuz. The overarching priority for the United States post-Epic Fury is ensuring that the Strait of Hormuz remains free and open to all commercial traffic. The United States should continue rotating Marine Expeditionary Units, manned and unmanned minesweepers, and Apache helicopters through the region. These forces will deter Iran from remilitarizing small islands in the strait, using IRGC fast boats to harass commercial shipping, announcing arbitrary closures, or imposing tolls. A residual force in the Arabian Sea would be well positioned to intercept ships from adversaries attempting to transport weapons or components to Iran.⁶    

Second, prevent Iranian reconstitution. The U.S. military struck over 13,000 targets in Iran, destroying 80 percent of Iran’s air defense systems and hundreds of ballistic missile and drone production and storage facilities.⁷ Yet Iran has demonstrated an ability to rearm quickly.⁸ U.S. carrier battlegroups served as the workhorse for offensive operations inside Iran. Carrier-based aircraft were responsible for thousands of sorties while other elements of the battlegroup—like attack submarines and destroyers—launched over 850 Tomahawks at targets deep inside Iran and hundreds of air defense interceptors protected the fleet and land-based forces from Iranian fire respectively.⁹ A consistent carrier battlegroup rotation in the Middle East offers a suite of capabilities essential to “mowing the lawn”: striking new missile, drone, or nuclear facilities in Iran. 

Third, provide space for U.S. allies to rebuild and rearm. Since the beginning of the war, Iran has launched nearly 5,000 projectiles at predominantly civilian and energy targets located in the Gulf.¹⁰ It will take years to repair the damage; the world’s largest LNG plant in Qatar could take five years alone.¹¹ Meanwhile, the Gulf states have expended thousands of expensive interceptors defending themselves, nearly exhausting stocks which will take years to replace.¹² 

Maintaining peace will require sustaining air dominance. While U.S. aircraft can conduct offensive operations over Iran largely unimpeded, Iran’s stockpile of offensive missiles and drones remains a formidable threat.¹³ The United States established a comprehensive air defense network during wartime by temporarily redeploying several THAADs and Patriots from Asia and Europe to the Middle East.¹⁴ As these systems return home, post-war posture should rely upon a layered air defense architecture that relies on “cheap defeat” systems like Ukrainian counter-drone interceptors to handle low end threats combined with Patriot and THAADs well suited to intercept Iranian missiles.¹⁵ 

Basing 

The United States should reconsider both the composition of the forces postured in the region and where they are deployed. 

Prior to Epic Fury, major facilities like Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar or 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain were emptied of personnel and expensive equipment given their proximity to Iran. They were diverted to and executed combat operations from their new bases in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.¹⁶ 

Instead of returning valuable aircraft to vulnerable facilities, the United States should explore long-term basing at existing wartime facilities. Located further from Iran, they offer better optionality and strategic surprise for future strikes. Also relevant is that some Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, initially imposed restrictions on the U.S. military’s use of their bases during Epic Fury and Project Freedom.¹⁷ This will require renegotiating, expanding—or in the case of Israel, new—basing and access agreements. 

The war also exposed several resiliency shortfalls, particularly in base infrastructure, radar, and counter-drone systems. In the opening days of the war, a Shahed delivered a direct hit on a small Army outpost in Kuwait, killing six soldiers.¹⁸ It was tragically preventable. Most bases, especially smaller outposts, are only fortified to withstand mortar and rocket blasts fired by insurgents.¹⁹ Precise Iranian strikes damaged over 200 structures or equipment at bases across the region.²⁰ Post-Epic Fury, all U.S. facilities—especially those near Iran’s borders—require hardening to withstand aerial attacks along with mass employment of inexpensive counter-drone systems to defeat waves of Iranian drones.²¹ 

Iran has repeatedly targeted and destroyed several high-value missile defense radars across the region, exposing the vulnerability of critical yet largely static assets.²² The damage has caused delays in early warning alerts about incoming fire and opened holes in the U.S. and allied air defense network in the Middle East. Repairing and improving the network will require billions to replace destroyed systems.

Allies 

U.S. regional allies acted as a force multiplier during the war, but there is room for improvement. The Gulf states suffered enormous damage to their energy and commercial sectors and are a value-add with their air defense network, yet they launched limited counterattacks and refused to publicly join U.S.-Israeli offensive operations despite having nearly 700 modern fighters—a number comparable to the U.S. and Israeli force.²³, ²⁴ If these allies are unwilling to contribute their offensive capabilities when they are under direct attack, then the United States should reevaluate future industrial cooperation and military planning contingencies. 

Epic Fury also showed why Israel is a “model ally.” The U.S. and Israeli militaries demonstrated a remarkable division of labor with Israel targeting the regime apparatus it spent years surveying while U.S. forces conducted strikes.²⁵ Any future plans for reducing the U.S. military footprint in the region will rely on deeper institutionalized relationships with the Israeli military, including improved interoperability, intelligence sharing, and industrial cooperation. 

Conclusion 

Many strategists in Washington have awaited the day when the United States could shift its force posture out of the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. It is prudent to recall the last time policymakers thought conditions allowed for such a shift. Following the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, President Biden’s National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, wrote in Foreign Affairs, “although the Middle East remains beset with perennial challenges, the region is quieter than it has been for decades.”²⁶ Five days later, the October 7 attacks threw the Middle East into a new round of chaos. 

In the two years between the Afghanistan withdrawal and October 7, there was no U.S. carrier presence in CENTCOM.²⁷ October 7 and the ensuing instability was due to an opportunistic Islamic Republic that believed the United States was disengaged from the region. The result has been an unabated conflict that has forced the United States to surge its presence.²⁸ This has come at a price. Admiral Paparo warned these surges stress “finite limits to the magazine [depth]” and frequent deployments of INDOPACOM assets to CENTCOM have forced him to adopt “some entrepreneurial approaches” to maintain sufficient presence in his AOR.²⁹ 

As long as the current regime is in power, Iran is a threat to regional security. Maintaining a post-Epic Fury peace will require sustained American strength, including consistent carrier and marine amphibious group rotations, air dominance, revitalized bases, and capable, willing allies. 

Most importantly, the enduring presence of American strength is the best path to avoid a repeat of the USS Lincoln saga. Epic Fury revealed that the simultaneity challenge is real, and maintaining a sufficient force presence in the Middle East long term will require a larger U.S. military. The president’s $1.5 trillion defense program promises to expand our industrial base to produce enough munitions for simultaneous requirements and increasing mass to reduce the burden and presence tradeoffs the military faces today. 

American strength has always served as a “sheltering arm for freedom in a dangerous world.”³⁰ Realizing a larger U.S. military and enduring presence in the Middle East could mean the next time the president promises “help is on the way,” it arrives in time to shape regional security.