A U.S. and Allied Strategy for Greenland

The United States is an Arctic nation. As such, ensuring the security of the Arctic region should be a key priority for the United States and its allies. Yet the region is increasingly contested. Russia has steadily invested in the Arctic, building and refurbishing civilian and military infrastructure in alignment with its strategic goals. China, despite not being an Arctic state, has also moved to position itself as a regional power in the Arctic, investing in capabilities and competencies while partnering with Russia. At the same time, the United States has underinvested in the region for decades, ceding presence and influence. Against this backdrop, U.S. President Donald Trump has made clear his desire for the United States to take a more active role in securing Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory forming part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a NATO ally. Washington has the tools and the ability to chart a productive path forward that ensures U.S. presence in the strategically important region of the Arctic, while respecting the sovereignty of Greenland and Denmark, and strengthening relations with allies.

The Arctic region as a whole, and Greenland in particular, are vital for defense of the U.S. homeland. The most existential threats to the U.S. homeland—from ballistic and cruise missile threats to nuclear bombers to nuclear submarines—all either emanate from or will likely pass through the Arctic on their way to the United States. Greenland’s Arctic location makes it a critical site for early warning systems detecting airborne threats to the continental United States, and its position alongside the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap makes it crucial for monitoring seaborne threats in the North Atlantic, such as Russian submarines. It is also uniquely suited for space domain awareness and control and for satellite downlink capabilities.

The U.S. defense presence in Greenland dates back to World War II when the United States operated several airfields and weather stations on the island after Denmark was occupied by Nazi Germany. Following the war, in 1951, the United States and Denmark formalized the defense relationship in Greenland with an agreement that gives the United States broad latitude to station troops and establish bases in, and conduct operations from, the island. During the Cold War, the United States operated multiple bases and airfields. Since then, however, U.S. defense investment in Greenland has declined and persistent U.S. presence is now limited to about 200 personnel at Pituffik Space Base in the north of Greenland.

The United States, however, is not the only country to recognize the Arctic’s strategic importance, and in many cases the United States lags behind adversaries like Russia and China. Russia is the largest Arctic nation and, as such, the Arctic plays an outsized role in Russia’s economy and in its defense strategy. The Russian Arctic is home to abundant oil and gas reserves, and Russia is seeking to monetize the “Northern Sea Route” to take advantage of anticipated shipping traffic along its increasingly ice-free northern coast. Russia has invested heavily in its Arctic military infrastructure despite its ongoing losses in Ukraine, and the Arctic remains home to the bulk of Russia’s maritime strategic forces based in the Kola Peninsula.

China has increased its interest and activity in the Arctic since at least 2018 when it declared itself a “near Arctic state.” China operates five ice-capable research vessels, which it uses for scientific research at both poles. Much of this research is dual use.¹ China has also sought to fund infrastructure and mining projects in Greenland as part of its “Polar Silk Road.” However, most of these efforts have not come to fruition, as successful collaboration between Washington and Copenhagen—including during the first Trump Administration—worked to effectively counter Chinese investment.² Today, only one unrealized mining site in Greenland has any level of Chinese investment, and that investment is only a minority stake.³ Similarly, the other Arctic allies (Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) have restricted Chinese investment in critical infrastructure projects and moved to end projects with Chinese involvement.⁴⁵

Although Russia and China are increasingly collaborating in the Arctic, their military activity around Greenland is practically nonexistent. Indeed, there have been at least a dozen provocative Russian actions near Alaska in the last five years, including a Russian-Chinese combined bomber patrol and combined surface action group exercises, compared to zero around Greenland.⁶ 

As the Arctic continues to warm and open, the region is attracting attention as a source of valuable raw materials. Greenland in particular is home to as-yet untapped deposits of critical minerals and rare earth elements important for modern technology from artificial intelligence to fighter jets. Currently, China mines some 60 percent of the world’s critical minerals, giving them considerable control of the supply chain for these resources.⁷ An alternative source in Greenland would be immensely valuable. In recent years, Greenland has encouraged mining exploration to develop these deposits, soliciting bids from U.S. and other Western sources.⁸ Mining in Greenland, however, is difficult and expensive. The harsh Arctic climate confines meaningful work to warmer seasons, and Greenland’s lack of infrastructure means that everything—from roads, to ports, to power infrastructure, to housing—must be built from scratch. Market conditions alone do not support large-scale mining in Greenland.⁹

To address these challenges, my colleagues at the Atlantic Council and I recommend a four-part defend, deny, deepen, and develop strategy.¹⁰ This strategy can be carried out while still respecting the sovereignty of Denmark. 

First, to defend the homeland, the United States must give the Arctic a clear strategic mandate that empowers senior leaders to advocate for needed investment in infrastructure in Greenland, Arctic capabilities, and training to operate in the Arctic. Empowered by this mandate, the United States should take full advantage of the 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense agreement and rebuild its military presence in Greenland. Announcing three sites for increased U.S. access in March 2026 is a positive first step.¹¹ Alongside this infrastructure investment, the United States should invest in needed capabilities for operations in the Arctic including improved all-domain awareness, resilient, space-based communications, and resilient command and control architecture.

Second, the United States and its allies can continue to deny adversary domination of the Arctic through collaborative efforts. This can include continued screening of investments in critical infrastructure and mineral access to exclude risky investments from adversaries. The United States and allies should also continue to highlight and push back against adversary overreach in the Arctic including airspace violations and excessive claims on Arctic waterways.

Third, Denmark and other NATO allies have a deeper role to play in the region. As an important first step, the alliance should make the Arctic Sentry multi-domain activity an enduring mission.¹² This will ensure persistent allied presence in the Arctic as an additional backstop for the day-to-day activities of Arctic allies Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. An enduring Arctic Sentry mission can also provide a cornerstone for concrete NATO defense planning for the Arctic, providing the impetus for broader engagement in the region and investment in Arctic capabilities. Similarly, Denmark should follow the lead of Eastern European allies like Lithuania and provide host-nation support to offset the cost of the U.S. military presence in Greenland.

Fourth, while resource development in Greenland is currently expensive, there are steps that the United States, Denmark, and other allies can take to lower the financial burden. The United States and Denmark should employ the Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the Export and Investment Fund of Denmark to provide loans, loan guarantees, and insurance to incentivize private-sector investment. The European Union can use its own mechanisms to support economic development, and offtake agreements from NATO allies could boost demand. Mineral development in Greenland should be done in close cooperation with Greenlanders themselves, ensuring local buy-in and benefit.

The Arctic will only continue to grow in strategic importance in the coming years, from defense and security to resources and trade. The United States and its allies have the tools they need to address the most pressing issues in the region. They just need to use them.