Deterrence in the Modern Era: A 360-Degree Industrial Approach to European Security

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finds itself at a historic crossroads as leaders prepare for the upcoming Summit in Ankara, Türkiye on July 7–8, 2026. The geopolitical landscape is shifting rapidly, characterized by an assertive China, a prolonged war in Ukraine, an Arctic region that has become increasingly accessible, and heightened tensions in the Middle East. Against this volatile backdrop, the return of the Trump Administration and the release of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) have fundamentally altered the tone and expectations of transatlantic relations.

President Donald Trump has long maintained a transactional view of the alliance, characterizing NATO as a “one way street” where the United States shoulders an unfair share of the burden while protecting wealthy allies. Following a tense 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague where allies agreed to a new guideline of spending 5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035, the upcoming 2026 Summit in Ankara will serve as the first major audit of those ambitious commitments.

The Trump Administration's posture points toward a radical rebalancing of the alliance, coercing Europe and Canada to transition from a consumer of American security to the primary guarantor of their own defense. This can only be achieved, however, if NATO members politically and economically can muster the necessary industrial capacity to meaningfully contribute to their own defense.

The Importance of the NSS and NDS for Europe

The release of the Trump Administration’s NSS and NDS signaled a decisive shift demanding a structural transformation of European force generation, a massive scaling of defense industrial capacity, and a new division of labor within the transatlantic alliance. The allies, too, have recognized that they need to be playing a larger role in being responsible for continental security, partly due to pressure from the administration, and partly due to the belief the United States may no longer be a reliable partner.

While there is plenty of “Trump bashing” over how the president and his team message to NATO allies, the NSS and NDS have formalized a reality that has been building for decades dating back to at least the George W. Bush Administration, if not before: the United States has global interests and priorities and needs to share the burdens of being a security provider with capable allies. Successive U.S. presidential administrations have asked Europe to take on more defense obligations within the European theater with minimal success. Many Eastern European allies warned about the Russia threat that faced the continent. Under the new NSS/NDS framework, the Trump Administration is placing the responsibility of first-line continental European defense on the shoulders of Europe’s NATO members to provide the bulk of the conventional forces, armor, and munitions required to deter Russia.

Expectations for Ankara

In Ankara, the White House is keenly interested in reviewing what allies have individually and collectively done to increase defense spending on needed capabilities since the Hague Summit. While the story may be positive for some allies, most NATO members have yet to make an appreciable difference in increasing their defense capabilities towards meaningful change. This may lead to President Trump praising the spenders and bashing the perceived resistors; all of which may reduce alliance cohesion and prevent focus on meaningful goals related to increased defense cooperation, manufacturing and production, and improved capabilities.

The Trump Administration remains critical of Europe's dependence on high-end U.S. military assets. Europe continues to rely on the United States for strategic enablers, including air-to-air refueling tankers, heavy strategic airlift, satellite reconnaissance, and advanced air defense systems. For the Trump Administration, Europe has failed to pool its resources to acquire capabilities independently.

European leaders must avoid using rhetoric justifying their increased defense spending as a means to achieve “strategic autonomy.” Such a sentiment—while arguably appealing to some in the administration and Congress—implies a divorce from Washington. Instead, NATO leaders should emphasize taking on more “responsibility sharing,” which seeks to establish a stronger, more capable European pillar within NATO, allowing the United States to focus on other priorities in the NSS and NDS.¹

Addressing NATO’s Readiness and Shortfalls

The Ukraine War exposed a crisis in NATO’s readiness and defense industrial base that the Trump Administration is demanding be addressed. Across the alliance, the war found ammunition shortfalls in inventories and production, logistics dependencies, and interoperability inconsistencies across platform and system standards.

Resolving these shortfalls requires a fundamental shift in defense procurement mindset and approaches. European nations must prioritize closing gaps in necessary capabilities, incentivize industry to reinvest in development and manufacturing, embrace scalable production of attritable systems, partner with U.S. defense firms and enter into licensing agreements to increase surge capacity, and buy interoperable and interchangeable defense systems across the NATO ecosystem.

To achieve this, governments must provide the defense industry with long-term, multi-year procurement contracts. Just as in the United States, European defense companies cannot justify investing in new factories and hiring workers based on single-year orders. By guaranteeing demand over the next five to ten years, European governments can incentivize the private sector to rebuild their industrial capacity.

Benchmarks for Increasing Defense Capability

Currently, NATO faces a readiness gap characterized by fragmented supply chains and depleted stockpiles. To restore credibility, Europe must transition from static deterrence to dynamic preparedness. The alliance needs measurable benchmarks over the next five years to make European strategic autonomy a reality.

First, a NATO member should only embark on increasing its defense spending with plans tied to NATO goals and objectives. Any efforts by individual NATO allies should rely on NATO’s strategic frameworks to inform national defense spending and production increases.

Second, capability benchmarks must focus on deep-strike assets, logistics, and “counter” systems, such as long-range cruise missiles, armed drones, precision-guided artillery, and counters for various asymmetric weapons that emerged from the Ukraine War and the conflict with Iran. Additionally, Europe must invest in military mobility—upgrading bridges, rail networks, and ports—to ensure that heavy armor can move rapidly from Western Europe to the Eastern flank or the Arctic Circle.

Third, allies should partner with Ukrainian defense firms to learn the lessons from four years of battlefield innovation, rapid production, and iteration. The Ukrainian defense industry has the capacity to rapidly scale and produce the needed shortfalls identified within NATO’s readiness gap.

Fourth, NATO allies cannot invest only in large platforms to show speed in spending or to appeal to President Trump. Equipment requires spare parts, sustainment packages, training programs, the ability to move them around battlespace, and power to make them useful in a fight. Buying a system but not having the necessary knowledge to deploy it effectively does not make it a usable deterrent capability.

Finally, translating political rhetoric into production requires deep, practical cooperation between the American and European defense industrial bases. Currently, protectionist policies on both sides of the Atlantic hamper efficiency and prevent the scaling of production. Reforming ITAR, FMS, and other U.S. policies and regulations to allow for fast-tracking approvals of European purchase requests is necessary to help NATO allies obtain more capability more quickly. Coupled with licensing and co-production agreements between U.S. and European manufacturers, such actions could rapidly bring additional military capacity to the continent.

Navigating the Political-Cultural Edge: The New Right and Alliance Cohesion

The evolution of NATO is occurring against a backdrop of intense political and cultural shifts within the United States. The rise of the New Right has brought a fierce skepticism of traditional internationalism. Prominent voices in this movement argue that Europe is a continent of free riders that has exploited American protection to build lavish welfare states while ignoring its own security. They question why American taxpayers should fund the defense of countries that often oppose U.S. economic and foreign policy interests.

These critiques shape U.S. expectations. The Trump Administration’s demands for higher European defense spending are not merely transactional policies; they are rooted in a deep-seated domestic political belief that the alliance model is unfair to American workers and soldiers. If ignored, this political friction threatens to destroy NATO's cohesion. If European leaders respond to New Right critiques with condescension or resistance, they will only fuel isolationist sentiment in the United States.

Policy tools exist to respond to these pressures without harming deterrence, and the most effective tool is action. When European nations demonstrably take the lead in aiding Ukraine or deploying forces to the Arctic, it directly refutes the “free-rider” narrative. Europe should frame its defense investments in ways that appeal to New Right priorities: purchases of American military hardware support U.S. manufacturing jobs, aligning European security needs with the “America First” economic agenda.

Conclusion

Europe has an opportunity to rebuild its own military strength and industrial capacity by setting hard benchmarks for spending and force generation, clearing stockpile shortfalls, and forging deep industrial ties with the United States.

While Europe takes the lead on conventional defense, the United States cannot and should not fully withdraw from the continent. The United States possesses unique, high-end capabilities—such as the strategic nuclear umbrella—that would take Europe decades and trillions of dollars to replicate. Withdrawing these assets would create a power vacuum that invites aggression. Collectively the allied nations must demonstrate to Washington that they understand what their role is in this transatlantic partnership. By doing so, there will be more capability, more stability, and, hopefully, more trust.