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Burden-Sharing, Hard Power, and the U.S.-Israel Alliance

By Seth Jones

“There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”1

— Winston S. Churchill

 

Alliances can be both challenging and indispensable, as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed. Some allies shirk their responsibilities and create a free rider problem, reaping the benefits of a collective good without contributing their fair share of the costs. NATO has been a classic example of the free rider problem. This essay examines the U.S.-Israel alliance in light of Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury. It focuses primarily on the strategic, operational, and tactical cooperation during warfighting, and it argues that Israel has been a strong U.S. partner and a good example of what a model ally can provide. Israel’s military and intelligence services demonstrated a high level of interoperability with the United States, shared actionable intelligence, successfully engaged in major combat, and fostered an innovative and vibrant defense industrial base.

 

The rest of this essay is divided into four sections. The first outlines U.S.-Israeli shared interests. The second section examines burden-sharing and interoperability, particularly during Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury. The third explores Israel’s development of a vibrant defense industrial base. And the fourth section discusses how they worked through inevitable challenges.

 

Shared Interests

Like all allies, the United States and Israel cooperate for multiple reasons. Both are democracies that share common political and economic interests. They also share a common threat: Iran. For Israel, Iran poses a significant—and perhaps existential—threat because of its nuclear ambitions; commitment to the destruction of the state of Israel; cooperation with partner forces throughout the region, such as Lebanese Hezbollah; and revolutionary ideology.

 

Iran also presents a threat to the United States. In Iraq, for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force provided significant assistance, including improvised explosive devices, to Shia militant groups who fought the United States. Between July 2005 and December 2011, a startling 1,534 explosively formed penetrators—a particularly deadly improvised explosive device with a shaped charge—killed 196 U.S. and coalition troops and wounded another 861 troops.2 The Quds Force built components for these explosively formed penetrators, such as infrared triggers and explosive circuits, in secret laboratories in Iran and then they smuggled them across the border to safe houses in locations like An Numaniyah and Basra concealed in oil drums, food containers, and other items. Several other Iranian partner forces, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Lebanese Hezbollah, also pose a threat to the United States.

 

Yet Iran is not the United States’ only—or even the main—security threat. The United States has other state and non-state threats outside of the Middle East, such as China, Russia, and North Korea that are part of an “axis of aggressors.” In fact, the most significant threat to the United States comes from China, not Iran. Beijing has modernized its military and rapidly advanced in all major domains of warfare. The People’s Liberation Army possesses formidable air and naval power, long-range precision strike systems, and advanced space and cyber capabilities that can threaten U.S. forces, bases, and logistics across the Western Pacific.

 

U.S. global interests—especially regarding China—make Israel a particularly valuable ally since Israeli military and intelligence capabilities have been effective in preventing the rise of Iran as a regional hegemon.

 

Burden-Sharing and Interoperability

Recent military operations demonstrate Israel’s value in burden-sharing and interoperability. Israel maintains an overwhelming qualitative superiority in airpower over Iran, a disparity exposed during Operation Rising Lion in 2025 and Operation Lion’s Roar—the parallel operation to the U.S. Operation Epic Fury—in 2026. The Israeli Air Force, one of the world’s most capable air forces, fielded advanced platforms like the Lockheed Martin F-35I, the heavily modified Boeing F-15I, and the Lockheed Martin F-16I. These aircraft were manufactured by U.S. defense companies and used by the U.S. military, making them highly interoperable with U.S. forces.

 

In addition, Israel has been highly proficient at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Israel achieved air superiority over Iran in only a few days during Operation Rising Lion and Operation Lion’s Roar. In 2025, Israel sustained this superiority until the ceasefire without losing a single manned aircraft or pilot, and the 2026 operation was similarly one-sided. The Israeli Air Force effectively degraded Iran’s missile force and air defense systems through layered attacks. Israeli counterstrikes also successfully disabled or destroyed many of Iran’s most advanced air defense systems, the Russian S-300 system.

 

Israeli operations in 2025 created the permissive conditions for U.S. B-2 stealth bombers to strike Iran’s Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, Natanz Nuclear Facility, and Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center during Operation Midnight Hammer. Israeli military and intelligence agencies were also exceptional in providing signals, human, imagery, and other types of intelligence; conducting offensive cyber operations; orchestrating space and counterspace operations; striking Iranian targets; and conducting electronic warfare.

 

In addition, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) inflicted severe attrition on Hamas in Gaza, resulting in the decapitation of its leadership and undermining its ability to strike Israel. Similarly, the IDF severely weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s leadership acknowledged that it suffered a 45 percent casualty rate during the Israeli campaign from October to November 2024—and further casualties in 2025 and 2026.3 Israel and the United States also conducted strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

 

Overall, Israel’s military and intelligence agencies shared the defense burden with the United States and were highly competent, active, and interoperable with U.S. forces in targeting a common enemy: Iran and its partner forces.

 

Arsenals of Democracy

Israel has also developed a vibrant industrial base to support its military. Washington provides annual foreign military financing that Israel uses for F-35I fighter aircraft, offensive munitions (such as MK-84s, MK-83s, MK-82s, GBU-39s, Joint Direct Attack Munitions, and BLU-109s), air defense systems and munitions (such as THAAD and Aegis), and other matériel. The need for this aid was highlighted during the June 2025 war, where defense against approximately 500 Iranian missiles consumed nearly all Israeli interceptor stocks and several years’ worth of U.S. production of high-end THAAD and SM-3 systems.4 Iran’s strikes in 2026 similarly strained Israel’s air defense stocks. These high expenditure rates underscore that while Israel possesses technological superiority over Iran, the sustainability and depth of its missile defense capacity remain partially dependent on U.S. assistance.

 

Nevertheless, Israel has developed a robust and innovative defense industry. Israeli companies have been particularly successful in the research, development, and production of air defense systems, unmanned and autonomous systems, cyber warfare tools, and advanced technology such as artificial intelligence. Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Elbit Systems, and other companies have developed world-leading platforms like the Iron Dome, Arrow interceptors, and Hermes drones. In addition, Israel’s Ministry of Defense and Rafael developed the Iron Beam, a high-power laser system designed to neutralize drones, rockets, and mortars at a fraction of the cost of traditional interceptors. Israel also has an increasingly vibrant venture capital community, which has invested private capital in the defense sector. One example is Aurelius Capital, which was founded by Alon Lifshitz and Tomer Jacob, former NSA director Michael Rogers, former Israeli Air Force Commander Major General Amir Eshel, and former Mossad Deputy Director Udi Lavi—demonstrating U.S.-Israeli cooperation.

 

Weathering the Storms

 The United States and Israel have weathered the predictable storms between allies. As Winston Churchill noted, coalition warfare can be dogged by diplomatic friction, competing national interests, and strategic disagreements. During World War II, U.S. and British political and military leaders repeatedly clashed over war aims and strategy—including over whether to invade first France in Operation Overlord or North Africa in Operation Torch—yet they found a way to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

 

It is unsurprising that there have been disagreements between U.S. and Israeli leaders. They prioritize threats differently. Iran is Israel’s most significant adversary, while the United States must deal with China and other axis countries. They also have different tolerances for casualties. Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Israel was willing to accept a higher level of civilian casualties in Gaza than some in the United States were willing to support. In addition, domestic politics is always a challenge, and U.S. and Israeli leaders must deal with their respective legislatures, courts, and populations. Still, they have weathered the inevitable storms.

 

Overall, Israel has been a strong partner and a good example of what makes a military ally: shared interests, reliable burden-sharing, interoperability, and a robust and innovative industrial base that provides a solution to the free rider problem.

[1] Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 1939-1945, ed. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 680.

[2] Seth G. Jones, Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare (New York: W.W. Norton, 2021), 110.

[3] “Hezbollah’s Limited Options for Supporting Iran,” Institute for the Study of War, February 28, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-limited-options-for-supporting-iran/.

[4] Wes Rumbaugh, “The Depleting Missile Defense Interceptor Inventory,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 5, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/depleting-missile-defense-interceptor-inventory.

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