Americas First, Authoritarians Last: The Trump Corollary as a Great-Power Competition Strategy

The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is at once consistent with America’s historic role in the Western Hemisphere and responsive to contemporary hemispheric defense challenges. The 2025 National Security Strategy and 2026 National Defense Strategy identify the corollary as President Donald Trump’s effort to “deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.”¹ Since January 2025, the Trump Administration has implemented this strategy to regain military and political prominence in the Americas. The economic arena, however, demands fiercer competition to extirpate the malign influence of extra-hemispheric powers.

America vanquished peer adversaries from its neighborhood before and can do so again. During the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan vigorously confronted the Soviet Union in the Americas. The Soviets, Reagan charged, violated the Monroe Doctrine by supporting revolutionary movements and using Cuba as a proxy.² Treating Latin America as a priority theater, Reagan pursued a combination of proactive diplomacy, military action, and economic statecraft to combat communism. By the end of his term, his calculated bid to shore up partnerships, spread freedom, and roll back Soviet influence rebalanced the region in America’s favor.³

Now, as then, great-power competitors have made inroads in America’s neighborhood. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has embedded itself deeply across economic, infrastructural, technological, military, and political domains. The strategic foothold of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) far exceeds that of past adversaries, from serving as South America’s largest trading partner to facilitating narco-terrorist drug trafficking operations. Russia, meanwhile, focuses on Arctic expansion, defense cooperation, energy sector penetration, and propaganda operations. Iran, though degraded by Operation Epic Fury, retains a limited presence, mostly through Hezbollah and influence operations. Among these challenges, the Chinese threat to U.S. national security proves greatest in scope and hardest to resolve.⁴

Under an “Americas First” approach, operationalizing the Trump Corollary to address such manifold challenges requires using all instruments of national power in an integrated campaign. The Trump Administration must combine diplomacy with force and commerce with tact.⁵

In doing so, the United States must continue generating deterrence through a robust theater posture and strengthened military alliances. Simultaneously, the United States must reduce the CCP’s stake in ports, critical minerals, infrastructure, and digital networks while increasing American investment and host-country ownership. Success will hinge on the Trump Administration committing sufficient resources to make the United States the preferred partner for trade, investment, and security cooperation in the Americas.

In Panama, the Trump Corollary has already wrought fundamental changes that reflect both the corollary’s feasibility and its broader applicability. Trump appointed a hands-on ambassador and invoked the Torrijos-Carter Treaties to reassert the neutrality of the Panama Canal—the hemisphere’s most vital chokepoint. Sustained public and private pressure led the Panamanian Supreme Court to annul Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison’s concession to operate the Balboa and Cristóbal ports. Panama also withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), began replacing Huawei equipment, renewed bilateral health cooperation, and increased business ties.

The Department of War (DoW), for its part, signed a new memorandum of understanding with Panama on rotational deployments and exercises, established the Joint Security Cooperation Group-Panama, and reopened the Jungle Operations Training Center. The DoW also enlarged its security operations with the Panama Canal Authority. By pairing targeted denial with partnership incentives, the Trump Administration reversed CCP gains in Panama and reinvigorated U.S.-Panamanian relations. America stands as Panama’s preferred security and commercial partner.⁶

Elsewhere, Trump’s hemispheric defense framework has been forceful. The DoW activated the U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command in December 2025 and conducted a sizable buildup of air and naval assets in the Southern Caribbean. Operation Southern Spear combats transnational criminal organizations and shadow tanker fleets. Operation Absolute Resolve removed the Venezuelan beachhead for China, Russia, and Iran, while Trump appears poised to replicate regime change in Cuba and Nicaragua.⁷ The Trump Administration also recently created the “Shield of the Americas,” a multi-tiered diplomatic and defense partnership, which aims to “keep external threats at bay” while destroying drug cartels.⁸ As U.S. Southern Command’s responsibilities grow, the president’s proposed $1.5 trillion defense budget would comfortably cover the modest fiscal burden.⁹

The U.S. armed forces alone cannot dislodge the PRC, but bolstering U.S. military dominance can create conditions for recovering American commercial superiority in the region. Harnessing the power of private American capital is the most effective way to fully implement the Trump Corollary. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) can be the main instrument for waging great-power competition. Through public-private partnerships, the DFC can help ensure the United States manages energy flows, safeguards critical resource access, secures friendly supply chains, and reduces adversarial dual-use infrastructure in the hemisphere.

Recognizing the strategic dilemma, Congress wisely broadened the DFC’s authorities, including permission to invest in high-income countries, and increased its global cap to $205 billion.¹⁰ American investment and development alternatives can now proceed at scale and at pace. Using debt, equity, and insurance, the DFC can de-risk projects, inject American capital, and set technology and governance standards that exclude adversarial influence.

Given Latin America’s geological endowment, the DFC can galvanize U.S. companies to obtain new deals in oil, gas, and mining. Opportunities abound. Argentina, Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela are projected to account for almost half of the worldwide crude oil output growth over the next five years.¹¹ South America also contains a large share of the global reserves of rare earths, lithium, and copper. America could diversify supply chains away from China, developing refining capabilities and even executing leveraged buyouts of BRI holdings. Allies and partners can advance those American aims. If trusted foreign firms win tenders, projects can become more American by incorporating U.S. subcontractors, technology, and financing. Together, American and partner-country companies can control strategic assets and develop economic corridors that connect remote, resource-rich areas in the Andes and Amazon to Atlantic ports.¹²

In conjunction with mobilizing capital, the United States can export the protocols and tools of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to restrain nefarious extra-hemispheric investments. If Congress amended legislation, CFIUS could dispatch experts to help regional partners build the capacity to screen inbound investments. Alternatively, the Trump Administration could seek bilateral agreements with regional partners to jointly review foreign investments. Either way, the United States possesses mechanisms to prevent the very problems currently facing the hemisphere while furthering regional integration.

Indeed, the United States can leverage hemispheric interdependence against the CCP. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement can not only boost the North American economy but also create a geoeconomic fortress to block Chinese exports, redirect foreign direct investment into Mexico, and potentially lay the foundation for a more ambitious initiative—a North American customs union to solidify the world’s biggest economic bloc against the CCP.

Diplomacy underpins such economic and security cooperation. Here, the Trump Administration must continue its effort, following the diplomatic “gardening” practice of Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, who cultivated trust and formed hemispheric bonds through consistent face-to-face engagement.¹³ To be sure, a slate of cabinet secretaries visits Latin America regularly. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first official trip abroad was to Central America and the Caribbean, after all.¹⁴ Still, President Trump must nominate ambassadors to fill every post in the hemisphere and press the Senate to confirm them. Any lesser measure would contradict the Trump Corollary’s purpose.¹⁵ American diplomats and embassies are the front lines for counteracting Beijing’s and Moscow’s insidious overtures with American reciprocity and dispelling their propaganda with the truth.

The region’s political transformation toward conservative governments redounds to America’s benefit. Capitalizing on the trend, the State Department should persuade the remaining 22 Latin American and Caribbean signatories to the BRI to withdraw. Likewise, forward-leaning ambassadors should highlight investment opportunities in key sectors, strategically communicating to both Wall Street and host countries where investments would serve U.S. national security interests and promote regional prosperity.

Public diplomacy is also essential to dispelling anti-American propaganda directed at the hemisphere. If partnership over predation is the theme, sovereignty, security, and standards are the watchwords. Embassies can use traditional media and digital platforms, and collaborate with local actors, to amplify the positive outcomes of U.S. engagement and publicize adversaries’ coercive practices. Coordinated messaging can frame DFC-backed projects and American defense cooperation as the superior alternative to China and Russia. The DoW’s Psychological Operations can augment the State Department’s efforts to great effect.¹⁶

Crucially, too, Trump’s personal diplomacy can reinforce his corollary. By both breaking with his past travel patterns and emulating the Reagan playbook, the president himself could undertake a regional tour that would signify the Western Hemisphere’s importance beyond the deployment of U.S. armed forces, capital, and diplomats.¹⁷

Over the next two years, the Trump Administration can further advance its successful strategic pivot to the Americas.¹⁸ To do so, the United States must act as the good neighbor that offers hemispheric partners credible alternatives delivering tangible benefits. As President Reagan said nearly 40 years ago, enforcing the Monroe Doctrine “continues our historic bipartisan American policy.”¹⁹ While great-power adversaries may change, the strategic logic remains the same. U.S. foreign policy must put the Americas first and push the authoritarians last.