A False Sense of U.S.-China Security

When Donald Trump met Xi Jinping in Beijing in May 2026, the two leaders agreed to establish a relationship of “constructive strategic stability.” Unfortunately, despite this moniker, the new U.S. approach is not constructive, strategic, or stable—particularly when it comes to Taiwan. Although the summit may have made a war over Taiwan less likely in the short term, this has come at the cost of longer-term cross-Strait stability.

The Beijing summit highlighted a disconnect in assessments of President Trump’s approach to Taiwan. Administration insiders insist that Trump is committed to maintaining the cross-Strait status quo during his administration. They argue that U.S. policy has not changed and that Trump has authorized a higher quantity of arms sales to Taiwan than other recent presidents. They also insist that Trump continues to assert he will not let China take Taiwan on his watch, and that Xi apparently responded to Trump that China will not take Taiwan “as long as you’re president.”¹

Many outside observers are skeptical. They read Trump’s public comments as undermining longstanding U.S. commitments to Taiwan and thereby increasing the risk of conflict. The administration’s delay in announcing a pending $14 billion arms sales package to Taiwan has fed fears that Washington is rethinking its support for Taipei. The dissonance between the administration’s supporters and detractors creates confusion in Beijing, Taipei, and beyond.

Of course, both positions can be true at the same time. Trump may be decreasing the odds of a large conflict over Taiwan in the near term. Yet doing so comes at the cost of heightened risk of a cross-Strait conflict in the long term, as well as increased risk of Chinese gray zone pressure in the near term. This is the paradox of President Trump’s approach. Beijing may see this arrangement as constructive, strategic, and stable (for now), but Washington should beware.

Trump’s Shifting Rhetoric 

The White House insists that U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed, but it is indisputable that Trump has approached Taiwan differently than his predecessors. In his first term, he broke with precedent even before taking office by accepting a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen. Soon thereafter, Trump embraced strategic competition with China and enabled a more forthright set of conversations on cross-Strait issues between Washington and Taipei, as well as with U.S. allies and partners. Key advisors such as Matt Pottinger, Jim Mattis, H.R. McMaster, John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and Randy Schriver helped deepen U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation and routinize arms sales.

After Trump left office, Joe Biden continued many of these cross-Strait initiatives. But he also spoke more forthrightly about U.S. support for Taiwan. When asked about his willingness to commit U.S. military forces if China attacked Taiwan, Biden asserted four times that he would come to Taiwan’s defense. Many experts questioned whether those statements broke with longstanding U.S. policy, including the logic of “strategic ambiguity.” Indeed, Biden’s comments were more strategic than they were ambiguous.

Trump has turned this logic on its head—in his second term, Trump has been more ambiguous than strategic about Taiwan. When Xi asked Trump whether he would fight for Taiwan, Trump said he replied, “I don’t talk about that.”² He also implied that Taiwan has “somebody there now that wants to go independent” before insisting, “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent,” and suggesting that both sides need to “cool down a bit.”³ In addition, he referred to arms sales to Taiwan as a “very good negotiating chip,” and stated, “I’m holding that in abeyance and it depends on China.” Trump called the Six Assurances that Ronald Reagan provided Taiwan in 1982 “old” and suggested they no longer bind U.S. policymakers.⁴ This set of comments has understandably led to deep concern in Taipei and beyond.

Trump’s Stability-Instability Paradoxes 

Despite confusion about Trump’s Taiwan approach, there is reason to believe that it might lower the chance of a major conflict over Taiwan in the short term. Conversations with Chinese officials and experts suggest that many believe Trump is determined not to “lose” Taiwan on his watch for fear of looking weak. Yet they also believe that Trump does not want to see cross-Strait issues derail the relationship with China, and that he will therefore limit U.S. support for Taiwan. This could quiet U.S.-China tensions over the Taiwan Strait in the coming months.

In the short term, there are at least five reasons to believe that Xi is unlikely to test Trump. First, since Trump is genuinely unpredictable, Xi may not want to test his willingness to use force. Second, with the 21st Party Congress coming up in 2027, Xi likely hopes to focus more on domestic concerns. Third, Xi’s purges of the People’s Liberation Army have likely undermined China’s ability to carry out a major military operation in the near term. Fourth, Trump’s reconsideration of arms sales to Taiwan could undermine Taiwan’s future defense capability, incentivizing Xi to wait before moving against Taiwan. Fifth, Chinese leaders hope that Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election will bring a more Beijing-friendly leader to power in Taipei. For all these reasons, China may want to avoid a war over Taiwan for the time being.

The paradox, however, is that while U.S.-China relations may be more stable over the next few years, Beijing will be incentivized to step up gray zone coercion against Taiwan in the short term and to increase pressure on the United States itself in the mid-to-long term. During the Cold War, strategists recognized that stability at higher levels of escalation could worsen instability at lower levels. They referred to this as the stability-instability paradox. Trump’s Taiwan approach is creating two related stability-instability paradoxes: a coalition paradox and a temporal paradox.

The coalition paradox is that Washington’s desire for bilateral stability with Beijing may incentivize China to increase its pressure on U.S. allies and partners, including Taiwan. By accentuating the ambiguity of U.S. commitments, Trump has raised doubts about U.S. credibility. This could embolden China to press U.S. allies and partners harder, especially at lower levels of escalation. The Trump Administration has also stated that it will provide “critical but limited support” to many allies and partners. Indeed, this year U.S. leaders have been more muted about China’s pressure on Taiwan, maritime coercion of the Philippines, and economic coercion of Japan. Stability in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship could therefore undermine regional stability by decoupling the United States from its coalition partners.

The temporal paradox, on the other hand, derives from Washington’s desire for near term stability in the U.S.-China relationship, which comes at the cost of long-term security. Beijing is using political pressure to undermine Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, hoping to bring to power politicians more friendly to the mainland. Trump has played into this by delaying arms sales to Taiwan. Doing so will both undermine Taiwan’s future defense capabilities and potentially bring to power a new set of political leaders in Taipei who are more amenable to Beijing’s demands. Whether through political coercion or military force, this could give China more tools to undermine the long-term status quo, thus creating a temporal stability-instability paradox.

Deterrence is the product of capability and credibility—critics are right that Trump’s comments during his Beijing trip risk undermining both components of deterrence. By reconsidering arms sales to Taiwan and thereby emboldening opponents of defense spending in Taipei, Trump could hamper Taiwan’s development of defense capabilities. At the same time, Trump’s comments about Taiwan being far away and hard to defend accentuate Taiwanese fears. Arms sales are therefore becoming a litmus test of the Trump Administration’s commitment to Taiwan. If Trump cancels, delays, or downgrades arms sales, it will therefore undermine not only Taiwan’s defense capabilities, but also its confidence in American credibility.

Thinking in Time 

President Trump’s trip to China produced few tangible deliverables, but it did cement the temporary détente between Washington and Beijing. Both sides want stability in the bilateral relationship at the moment, albeit for different reasons. But in the months ahead, Beijing will use carrots and sticks to try to undermine U.S. support for Taiwan as well as Taipei’s confidence in Washington. Chinese leaders will continue to condition “constructive strategic stability” on U.S. concessions. Decreased U.S.-China tensions today will come at the cost of greater risk tomorrow, while also enabling more Chinese coercion of U.S. allies and partners.

The stability-instability paradox serves as a reminder that in foreign policy as in physics, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. Even if the U.S.-China relationship appears more stable momentarily, cross-Strait risks will rise as Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election nears. Xi’s upcoming Party Congress and continuing People’s Liberation Army purges suggest that it might actually be wiser to accept that risk now, rather than deferring it to later. If American policymakers want to maintain the cross-Strait status quo and build a truly strategic and stable U.S.-China relationship, then the question is not whether to accept risk in the U.S.-China relationship, but when.