A Clash Within Civilizations

Perhaps more than any other politician, President Donald Trump thrives off today’s highly polarized political climate. It is fitting then that his recent National Security Strategy (NSS) is a bonfire of the pieties. The trend for these documents has been to elongate and enervate, which to many critics of the American-led international order reveals something important about the lack of clarity and intellectual rigor they perceive in the Blob. By comparison, this document is a model of parsimony.

But even at a brisk 29 pages, it includes topics that Americans typically do not see as the domain of their foreign policy apparatus. Cultural and civilizational issues occupy a considerable amount of space. This change reflects important realities that affect American interests and new crosscurrents that American strategists will puzzle over in the decades to come. Navigating them will be essential for continued American success in the second half of this century, to say nothing of the second quarter, and the NSS understandably does not fully solve this multigenerational challenge.

As is the case with any such document, there is considerable debate about the extent to which it reflects the administration’s actual priorities—particularly for a president who is famously impatient with long documents. The repeated descriptions of what American policy or goals “should” be illuminate some of this ambiguity, and the Middle East section in particular shows how quickly future-oriented policy guidance can appear dated. But at the very least, the NSS reveals how a vocal faction in this administration understands America’s role in the world and attempts to defend that view of the national interest.

To a certain extent, the NSS describes an America with more limited global ambitions. After the Cold War, “American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country,” the authors chide. “Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.”¹

This is a standard complaint among people who call themselves realists, regardless of how utopian or zany their other beliefs are, and it is usually followed by a rote prescription: cut back America’s commitments. But this document displays an actual realism about the global nature of American interests. The authors just think that the country made “hugely misguided and destructive bets on globalism and so-called ‘free trade.’”²

As any casual observer of Trump’s political career would expect, there is some tough medicine for America’s allies in the NSS. Multilateralism is out, and burden sharing is in. This is a reasonable demand to make of many American allies, particularly those who significantly overdrew their peace dividends and need to recapitalize their militaries. Despite the proclaimed intention of being “respectful of other countries’ differing religions, cultures, and governing systems,” the authors devote a lot of space to cultural and human rights issues.³ The specific issues they focus on, and their countries of concern, are very different than the norm, though.

The sections about the sources of American strength and greatness demonstrate what the authors believe a properly functioning culture looks like. For example, “long-term security is impossible” without “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health.” A healthy America “cherishes its past glories and its heroes” and “looks forward to a new golden age.”⁴ As they see it, these traits make this country dynamic and successful.

They spy storm clouds billowing over the far Atlantic shore. European elites share and even exceed the follies of their American counterparts. The European Union’s relative economic decline “is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure.”⁵ Transnational entities promulgate actions “that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies…censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence.”⁶ To them, “restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity” is one of “the United States’ core, vital [emphasis in original] national interests” which “we must focus on above all others, and that we ignore or neglect at our peril.”⁷

This is not just a problem for Europe. The continent “remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States,” and the United States “will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete.”⁸ This administration thinks Europe is more likely to wake up from a cold bath than a warm hug.

There are several strengths to the authors’ approach. The first is that it suits the president’s overall political project. Many Americans have long feared that transnational institutions, such as the United Nations and the European Union, undermine American sovereignty and threaten its civil liberties. Prominently criticizing these groups and their work is good politics. Liberty and representative government are also more likely to advance in the birthplace of democracy than in, for example, Saudi Arabia, so there is a Burkean logic at work. And success is important. Europe’s relative weight in global affairs is declining, but the shared cultural heritage makes Europe a more plausible long-term ally for the United States than many other places. Essentially, if the American system cannot beneficially affect Europe, it probably cannot do much good anywhere else either.

This civilizational and cultural lens for viewing foreign affairs is likely to grow in importance in the coming decades. Although the NSS does not depict Asia in those terms, many of the largest countries there, such as China and India, see themselves more as embodiments of distinct civilizations than as nation-states. American policymakers and statesman who ignore this dynamic will struggle to understand the forces shaping the region.

Technological developments will also bring these issues to the fore. As scientists learn to more effectively manipulate living matter, the imminent biotech revolution will force discussions about the nature of humanity out of the salon and onto the hustings. Rediscovering spiritual and ethical moorings will be just as important for entire societies and cultures as for bioethicists, and it may be the only way to promote human flourishing through these new technologies rather than ushering in a dark age. If Americans and Europeans keep a firm grasp of their roots, they will already be halfway to forging a biotechnological alliance that could determine the future of humanity. The NSS alludes to some of this when it notes correctly that “transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of American prosperity,” and that “Europe is home to cutting-edge scientific research.”⁹

Revitalizing American and European societies is therefore a tall task and a necessary one. This will be a multigenerational effort, and the NSS cannot fully delineate it. The authors correctly note that European governments are too censorious and eager to impose regulations on economic and political activity. Those regulations have been more effective at restricting good products than bad ideas.

Unfortunately, the authors of the NSS misidentify their best partners for revitalizing Europe. It is good, as they recommend, to “continue to stand up for genuine democracy, freedom of expression, and unapologetic celebrations of European nations’ individual character and history.” The national aspirations of Central and Eastern Europeans were one of America’s great assets in the Cold War, and when properly managed, they continue to advance American interests. Ironically, those countries joined transnational entities like the European Union to protect their sovereignty from Russia’s transnational imperialism. Many of them have political parties that take defense seriously but believe Brussels has become too overbearing. From an American perspective though, the “growing influence” of the other so-called “patriotic European parties” is cause for concern, not “great optimism.”¹⁰

The American right often fundamentally misunderstands European politics the same way the NSS’s authors do. It often casts a sympathetic glance at the European right, which invariably returns a scornful and contemptuous glare. Throne-and-altar conservatives damned the United States as the epicenter of capitalism, or of world Jewry, or of commoners voting, and their heirs broke out the champagne to watch the Twin Towers burn.¹¹ The Euroskeptic parties on the right and the left that undermine Europe’s collective defense display the most advanced form of the anti-American brain rot that hastens their countries’ decay. They despise the European Union largely because they see it as an American creation and tend to stew in backwards-looking ethnic and territorial grievances. Americans will be better served if their diplomats and strategists work on high tech, not historical Transylvania.

Europe and the Americas share a common civilizational heritage, and their societies have prospered to the extent that they have embraced the great truths found in their traditions. Rediscovering those deep sources of wisdom is a vital task, and the authors of this NSS deserve thanks for highlighting its importance. The United States will probably fare better though if it partners with Europeans that actually like it.