What “Americas First” Tells Us About “America First”

In the early days of the Trump Administration’s second term, Latin America experts started noticing a clear trend. The earliest appointments—from Secretary of State Rubio, to Deputy Secretary Landau, to Ambassadors to Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, and Panama—all seemed to have one thing in common: Latin America. 

Quickly, “America First” became rebranded in foreign policy circles as “Americas First,” emphasizing President Trump’s second term commitment to a reimagined Monroe Doctrine. But while President Trump has focused priority attention on the region, much of it has exclusively emphasized border security. While this is critically important following the border security crisis of the Biden years, a truly reimagined Monroe Doctrine requires a clear positive agenda to help transform the region into an engaged partner committed to protecting both American and regional sovereignty. 

President Trump’s “Americas First” Vision for the Americas 

While President Trump’s policy toward Latin America has undergone a few notable changes between his first and second terms, there is consistency in both administrations on four themes: 

• The Americas demand American leadership.

• Individual leaders, rather than historical precedent, determine one’s status as an ally or adversary.

• The defense of U.S. sovereignty is a presumed pre-condition for any American engagement.

• U.S. sovereignty includes not merely borders, but freedom from undue economic coercion 

First, President Trump seems to subscribe to the idea of spheres of influence, with Latin America and the Caribbean within the American sphere.  In 2018, President Trump spoke of the Monroe Doctrine as the founding philosophy for his policy toward Latin America, noting, “It has been the formal policy of our country since President Monroe that we reject the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere and in our own affairs.”[i] What is crucial to note about the Monroe Doctrine, however, is that it not only formalized America’s expectation that the European continent would not involve itself in the hemisphere, it also pledged that the United States would not interfere in the affairs of the European continent. Implicit in this framing was a sense that each continent would handle the affairs of their region, rather than seek broad individual supremacy. 

Second, President Trump seems to adhere to Lord Palmerston’s vision that “we have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies.” Over the last few years, populist leaders in the region have swung foreign policy in unexpected directions. As an example, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro swayed Brazilian votes in the U.N. to align with both Israel and the United States[ii] despite a prior record of voting against Israel nearly 80% of the time.[iii] Similarly, Colombia’s foreign policy shifted significantly from President Ivan Duque to President Gustavo Petro, most obviously as it relates to Colombia’s now accommodationist policy toward Venezuela’s dictator. Perhaps because of his own lack of constraint by precedent and his observation of these phenomena, President Trump does not view past as prologue. This works both ways. In the case of traditional allies, disagreements between President Trump and allied leaders could stall existing partnerships; in the case of traditional adversaries, it may mean rejuvenated opportunities for engagement. 

Third, sovereignty is the guiding principle for the president’s foreign policy. He both views collaboration on sovereignty as cause to ignore other failures as well as a lack of cooperation as a cause for penalty. President Trump’s emphasis on sovereignty is most clear in his use of foreign policy to support border enforcement. He penalized Mexico by threatening a 25% tariff—notwithstanding significant impacts on key industries in the United States—to force them to collaborate on border security, ultimately securing a Mexican commitment to dedicate 10,000 border guards to advance U.S. counternarcotics and immigration policy.[iv] He established a close relationship with President Nayyib Bukele of El Salvador, who has actively taken responsibility for illegal Venezuelan immigrants and whose mano dura policies—while being questioned for their implications for human rights and democracy—effectively transformed El Salvador from a leading source of illegal immigration to the U.S. to essentially negligible. 

Fourth, President Trump’s vision of sovereignty includes our ability to manage our economic access and national security without undue coercion from others. This is why Panama has found itself in President Trump’s crosshairs. Over 70% of traffic through the canal either comes from or is going to the United States,[v] making it a potential Chinese noose around the neck of American industry and therefore a central impediment to President Trump’s vision of sovereignty. This is why, notwithstanding Panama’s capitulation to find new port operators, to counter illegal migration through the Darien gap, to exit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and to partner with U.S. firms on major infrastructure projects, President Trump remains unsatisfied by the U.S.-Panama partnership. He will likely remain so until guarantees can be made to advantage U.S. trade and industry, no matter what other promises he can get. 

The question, then, is what unites these principles. The answer is the same as the answer to another important question implicitly asked by President Trump: when was America great? In the words of former Special Envoy for Latin America Mauricio Claver Carone, “When [the President] talked about the golden age of America, he harkens back to McKinley, to the Panama Canal. He harkens back to the industrialization of America, the seeds that had the 20th century being the great American century.”[vi] The President himself acknowledged this in 2016, also pointing to the turn to the century.[vii] That moment in history is the greatness to which President Trump seeks to return: when America exerted dominance in our region but was not yet pushed to action across the Atlantic, when sovereignty was a central question as nations began to rebel from their colonialist rulers, when  high tariff rates led to a booming American industry, and when America was beginning to build a culture and reputation that would eventually become the envy of the world. His second-term policies reflect those same principles.

Upcoming Opportunities to Secure American Advantage: The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine 

Ultimately, if President Trump aims to promote American sovereignty and industry by taking inspiration from 19th and 20th century Monroe Doctrine policies, he can do so most effectively by revising them to confront the new challenges and opportunities brought by the 21st century. Despite his invocation of the Monroe Doctrine, the President’s priority in the region to date has been to secure America’s border and pursue his deportation agenda. This is a central priority – as stated in his 2017 National Security Strategy[viii], protecting the homeland should and will always remain the first priority in his foreign policy. That said, if he seeks to ensure long-term, transformative success in the region and guard the hemisphere against adversarial intrusion, he will need to advance a forward-looking agenda to operate alongside these border policies. Below is a set of recommendations to ensure success according to the President’s sovereignty-forward, industry-oriented, power-balancing framework. 

First, we must expand our understanding of the Monroe Doctrine’s concept of “interference.” Defending against European interference in the 1800s was far easier to define and identify than interference today. It simply meant ensuring European militaries did not touch down on sovereign land in the hemisphere. Today, however, “interference” can mean anything from Chinese coercive economic practices and debt-trap diplomacy, to Iran’s propagandistic use of Spanish-language media, to foreign malign information spread through social media. To defend the region from external influence, we must acknowledge that hard power is not the only means through which to exert influence, nor is it often the most efficient. Accordingly, we must rebuild effective soft power programs, like President Trump’s Clean Network program, which was charged with replacing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) telecommunications infrastructure in Latin America and replacing it with trusted sources to protect against espionage. Whether this is achieved through a re-assessment of certain USAID programs or through external, private sector funding can be an open question. 

Second, we should break big power patronage networks. Latin American dictators rely heavily on outsiders like Russia and China. To defend our region from outside influence, we must increase the capability of dissidents to break the sources of power securing these leaders internally, which often takes the form of ensuring access to the internet to organize, providing training programs, and ensuring the resources for mobilization. While historically this has been framed as the right thing to do for its own sake, there are obvious benefits well beyond the remit of democracy. These dictators are the root cause of illegal immigration to the United States and their removal could be the single most effective way to advance American sovereignty and protect our border, to say nothing of ensuring Russia, China, and Iran lose their current influence. 

Third, a return to President Trump’s maximum pressure—and notably, an expanded use of secondary sanctions against nefarious regimes’ big power enablers—should define his second administration as well. As much as dissidents can do from the inside, external regime enablers function as a pressure release valve that can only be closed when fully cut off. President Trump’s April 2025 declaration establishing a “secondary tariff” of 25% on countries importing Venezuelan oil is an example of the kind of creative, maximum pressure steps that can be taken to hold Russia, China, and Iran accountable for their support for anti-American regimes in our hemisphere.[ix] We now must ensure countries are designated under this order. 

Fourth, President Trump should target terrorist financing sources, including of the cartels which are now rightly considered terrorist organizations rather than just criminal enterprises. The cartels exploded in growth over the last few years, taking advantage of America’s insufficient border policies. In 2021, cartels made an astonishing $13 billion from smuggling immigrants, an increase of $12.5 billion from just a few years prior.[x] These resources are used to fuel both violence and the perpetuation of the fentanyl trade, which has devastated American families. Securing the border is an important step in restricting their control, but increasing penalties for others in doing business with them is essential. By declaring Tren de Aragua a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), President Trump has opened the possibility of holding accountable those individuals and entities who knowingly conduct business with these gangs, limiting their ability to access key tools and resources. We should consider designating other cartels as FTOs following the important designation of the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. In addition to fulfilling the president’s ambitions to reduce illegal immigration and the flow of dangerous poisons across our border, it would also curtail money laundering activities conducted by proxies of foreign adversaries, like Hezbollah, which rely heavily on the permissive environment in the tri-border area.[xi] Similarly, we should recognize the reality that Venezuela’s Maduro regime has intentionally weaponized[xii] Tren de Aragua and designate Venezuela as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). 

Fifth, given his interests in promoting industry, President Trump should ensure his trade policy toward the region mitigates U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities. As we seek to rebuild our industrial base, the region can serve as a supplement to those areas where American industry is not yet adequately developed, particularly as it relates to the mining of critical minerals. Importantly, given the President’s recent emphasis on shifting “from aid to trade,”[xiii] to counter China, it is vital that Congress amend Development Finance Corporation (DFC) limitations on investments in Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs). Currently nearly 86% of Latin America qualify as UMICs, significantly hamstringing our ability to invest in their growth.

[i] Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly | New York, NY,” The White House, September 25, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.

[ii] Diana Lott, “Brazil’s ‘Rigged’ UN Vote Has Ended, Says Bolsonaro,” Folha de S. Paulo, April 12, 2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/world/2019/04/brazils-rigged-un-vote-has-ended-says-bolsonaro.shtml.

[iii] “Brazil Database,” UN Watch, accessed May 14, 2025, https://unwatch.org/database/country/brazil/.

[iv] “Mexico deploys the first of 10,000 troops to US border after Trump’s tariff threat,” Voice of America, February 6, 2025, http://voanews.com/a/mexico-deploys-the-first-of-10-000-national-guard-troops-to-us-border-after-trump-s-tariff-threat/7964846.html.

[v] Jose Cordoba & Santiago Perez, “The Pro-American Panama Leader Standing Between Trump and the Canal,” The Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/the-pro-american-panama-leader-standing-between-trump-and-the-canal-54b33fd6.

[vi] Ben Schreckinger, “Trump’s Envoy Lets Loose on the Panama Canal and ‘Imminent’ Change in Cuba,” Politico, February 12, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/02/12/mauricio-claver-carone-interview-trump-latin-america-00203718.

[vii] Maggie Haberman & David Sanger, “In Donald Trump’s Worldview, America Comes First, and Everybody Else Pays,” The New York Times, March 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy.html.

[viii] Donald J. Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, December 18, 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

[ix] Donald Trump, “Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil,” The White House, March 24, 2025,https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/imposing-tariffs-on-countries-importing-venezuelan-oil/.

[x] House Homeland Security Committee, “‘Now Nobody Crosses without Paying:’ Senior Border Patrol Agents Describe Unprecedented Cartel Control at Southwest Border,”  U.S House of Representatives, Dcember 14, 2023, https://homeland.house.gov/2023/12/14/now-nobody-crosses-without-paying-senior-border-patrol-agents-describe-unprecedented-cartel-control-at-southwest-border/#:~:text=As%20noted%20in%20the%20Committee's,border%20has%20only%20increased%20since

[xi] Marzia Giambertoni, “Hezbollah’s Networks in Latin America,” RAND Corporation, March 31, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA3585-1.html.

[xii] Antonio Maria Delgado, “Venezuela weaponized Tren de Aragua gang to hurt the U.S., FBI warned in January,” Miami Herald, May 29, 2025, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article307448401.html

[xiii] Nandita Bose, Andrea Shalal, Jeff Mason, “Trump sells shift from 'aid to trade' in White House meeting with African leaders” Reuters, July 9, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-hosts-five-african-leaders-tariffs-aid-cuts-bite-2025-07-09/