The Cold War Paradigm is Inadequate for U.S.-China Strategic Competition

The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, while historic and perilous, lacked many of the facets and dangers of the U.S.-China competition.¹ The differences become clear when utilizing an updated analytical framework focused on the instruments of national power (commonly referred to as DIME-FIL).² 

Diplomatic 

A key distinction between the Cold War geopolitics and U.S.-China competition is the structure of international alignments. While an axis of authoritarianism and sympathies toward a so-called Beijing Consensus exists today, much of the world refuses to be overtly divided into a rigid ideological and geopolitical bloc.³ Many nations maintain cooperative relationships with both the United States and China, seeking to maximize benefits without fully aligning with either power. Countries engage with both superpowers without the strict binary choice that defined Cold War alliances. This makes the current international system much more fluid. In some circumstances, that favors the United States. However, given the Faustian bargain that many countries have made with China, there is significant risk as traditional allies and partners maybe less committed and reliable in their support of policies emanating from Washington.⁴ 

Informational 

The Cold War was marked by stark information barriers: the Iron Curtain divided East and West, and propaganda wars were largely state-controlled. Today, the internet, multinational platforms, social media, and the ubiquitous, 24-hour flow of communications is an insidious characteristic of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) battle against the United States and its values. the CCP has harnessed the power and mass of digital communications and social media for a constant barrage of propaganda, disinformation, and lies not only meant to disorient, but to shape international opinion and even U.S. domestic politics. China’s propaganda ecosystem has grown exponentially during the Xi Jinping era and is being unleashed both overtly and covertly in unprecedented ways that are difficult to stop or even impede. 

Military 

The military perils, particularly in the nuclear arena, that existed during the Cold War cannot be understated. Yet, we now know that in terms of defense technology and modern operating concepts the Warsaw Pact was no real match for NATO.⁵ In the Indo-Pacific, the correlation of forces favors China given the size and growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).⁶  The tyranny of distance to the most likely theaters of conflict puts the United States at a considerable disadvantage.⁷ While important and relevant, America’s hub and spokes system of bilateral alliances is not on par with NATO and certainly not a guarantee of tangible military support in case of conflict with China. 

Economic 

The most conspicuous difference between the Cold War and U.S.-China competition is in the realm of economics and international commerce. The United States and the Soviet Union maintained largely separate economic systems.⁸ In contrast, the U.S. and China are deeply economically intertwined.⁹ Bilateral trade reached almost $600 billion in 2024, and the two countries are bound by complex supply chains, cross-border investment, technology links, and financial markets.¹⁰ This level of economic interdependence creates constraints that were absent during the Cold War, making outright economic decoupling difficult and economically risky for both sides. However, it also creates a dependency that China has exploited on countless occasions not only in the United States, but worldwide. 

Finance 

The Soviet Union and its allies were not significant international financial players. China most certainly is. It has amassed net foreign assets worth $4.3 trillion, making it the world’s biggest creditor.¹¹ China recycled much of its foreign currency earnings into infrastructure in developing countries through the Belt and Road Initiative upending decades-old patterns of international finance and utilizing debt traps to ensnare vulnerable countries. China holds the third largest amount of U.S. treasuries.¹² While certainly a double-edged sword, a strategically timed, massive sell-off of those would cause incredible damage to the U.S. economy.¹³ Moreover, China’s leadership in efforts designed to lead to the de-dollarization of the global economy are directly aimed at negating what has long been a key American strategic advantage.¹⁴ 

Intelligence 

While the Cold War was certainly marked by ample examples of espionage and technical innovations in intelligence collection, the Chinese intelligence apparatus is next level. Chinese cyber collection, whether against U.S. government entities or private companies is unprecedented in scale and scope.¹⁵¹⁶ The Chinese-orchestrated hack referred to as Volt Typhoon was preparation for war against the United States mainland.¹⁷  The Chinese national strategy of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) seeks to eliminate barriers between civilian research and commercial sectors, and its military and defense industrial sectors.¹⁸ Coupled with Chinese domestic laws that compel companies and citizens to support intelligence efforts, the intelligence threat against the United States and its citizens is without any historic parallel.¹⁹ 

Law Enforcement 

During the Cold War, law enforcement was rarely a topic of concern. China’s selective enforcement of, or complete unwillingness to enforce, its own laws regarding the export of fentanyl and its precursor materials has killed scores more Americans than the Vietnam and Korean Wars combined.²⁰ On the other hand, the establishment of Chinese police stations on U.S. territory and in other countries as well as the rendition of dissidents is a new form of extraterritoriality. An additional consideration in Chinese malign actions is the exploitation of gray zone activities utilizing traditional law enforcement agencies such as the Coast Guard. Moreover, a new feature is China’s institutional use of lawfare whether in the South China Sea, vis-à-vis Taiwan, or within international organizations.²¹ Many analysts view this as setting the stage to potentially justify escalation to kinetic operations in the future. 

Conclusion 

Volumes have been written about the CCP’s plans and strategies to displace the United States as not only the preeminent Indo-Pacific but also global power.²² While the Soviets had similar objectives during the Cold War, they clearly had fewer tools at their disposal then the Chinese do now. This mandates scuttling the outdated lens of the Cold War for a new paradigm that examines relevant historical great power rivalries of the past but also incorporates economic competition, commercial dependencies, technological advancement, regional influence, military advances, and the vulnerabilities of access to reliable data and information. 

The first Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (2017) and National Defense Strategy (2018) served as clarion calls by openly recognizing and acknowledging that China is the defining national security challenge of the 21st century, something previous administrations never did.²³ It is now incumbent upon the second Trump Administration to build upon those earlier documents to provide a new north star for the nation, as the China challenge has only worsened in the intervening years.