A Response by Daniel Fata
Much has been written about the current strains and deficiencies of the U.S. defense industrial base in relation to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and a possible China-Taiwan confrontation. Without recounting all the reasons for the abundance of very public outcries about the nation’s inability to surge in the moment to meet munition demands, the reality is that decades-long DoD procurement policies favoring “just in time” delivery instead of “just in case” capacity mindsets have created a real problem for America and its global partners in terms of pre-war deterrence and wartime defense capabilities.
Approaches that call on the Department to spend more, institute faster production programs, increase foreign military sales, and incentivize the industrial base to invest in needed facilities, suppliers, and workers—which all are essential factors to bolster the nation’s ability to provide for its own military production needs—are welcome. But they will not be enough in the short term, i.e., the next 2-3 years, if China, Russia, and other adversaries become convinced America lacks the manufacturing means to produce the weapons necessary to legitimately deter aggression and, if necessary, defend and repel aggressive actions in Europe, the South China Sea, and elsewhere.
The reality we have come to learn during the past 18 months is that America does not have as much “integrated deterrence” as we thought. The nation lacks a comprehensive national industrial policy that leverages all the great technologies and minds American companies and universities have to offer. Arguably, we lack an overall defense industrial policy, too, despite great attempts in recent years to better understand what weaknesses, gaps, and critical failure points exist in today’s defense supply chain and marketplace. Companies are reluctant to self-invest in facility expansion and build munitions inventories without reliable government orders since they have had the rug pulled out from under them in years past. Defense spending politics, bad budgeting behaviors such as relying on Continuing Resolutions to fund the government, and an unwillingness to truly change risk-averse cultures and philosophies when it comes to defense contracting (both in the executive and legislative branches) have resulted in what we see today.
The Russia-Ukraine war has shown that the United States is not presently prepared for a long duration, high intensity war that could extend more than a few months. American warfighters and planners arguably had become comfortable in thinking we would be able to overwhelm an enemy in the first 72 hours of a conflict. And while they likely were not wrong at one point, if assessments are correct, America’s enemies are now becoming more capable across the spectrum and know where and how to inflict the most damage to us in the early days of a conflict.
One way to get at this challenge immediately—and ensure America’s armed forces are ready to sustain a fight beyond the first 72 hours and more into the “day 5 to 30” scenario—is to take a page from the Ukrainian military’s playbook: fuse existing, older defense items (munitions and platforms) with new, cutting-edge technologies, such as better sensors, seekers, and autonomous systems. We have seen what the Ukrainians have been able to do with old Soviet-era military goods simply by integrating updated sensor packages, control systems, and additive manufacturing applications. This same approach can be replicated with some of the older items that exist in America’s war stocks now.
Every year, the U.S. military takes hundreds and hundreds of munitions and weapons platforms out of service through decommissioning and “de-milling” them. Weapons are deemed to be beyond their “shelf life,” and the cost of continuing to maintain them inhibits the financial ability to acquire either updated versions or brand new, next generation systems. The lessons observed so far from the war in Ukraine offer an opportunity to bring new technology into the Department by updating older, already-paid-for systems. This is good for the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and it is also good for some of the smaller, either existing or new entrants into the defense market. It gives them a path to become part of the defense ecosphere, to increase the industrial base’s production capabilities, and to bring new (and, hopefully, more) workers into the supply chain. It also deepens the stockpiles available to America’s warfighters as well as those of our allies and partners.
This approach is not novel nor is it without detractors. Some will argue the older weapons are too old to reliably be used in combat. Others will say that any dollar spent on maintaining older weapons stocks is one less dollar that can be spent on new technologies. And the list goes on.
But here is the reality we currently face as a nation: We do not have the long-lead items necessary to rapidly build the massive quantities of stocks needed for a fight tomorrow in the South China Sea. We lack the ability to expeditiously retool and expand production capacity without materiel and people. And, as some have forecast, the defense industrial base workforce is leaving in droves due to an aging population, inconsistent defense funding commitments, and more attractive non-defense commercial opportunities. There are not enough highly-skilled workers at present to keep pace with production needs.
As Defense Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante said in October 2022, “production is deterrence.” Something must be done now so that America continues to be seen as a reliable arsenal of democracy, as a deterrent power, and as a nation that can figure out how to do hard things. This requires both creativity and flexibility in how near-term defense production is approached while, simultaneously, the Department and Congress undertake other measures to create durability in the future defense industrial base. There needs to be better synchronization between strategists, operational planners, logisticians, maintainers, and producers. Knowing what is likely needed for the fight includes knowing—and being honest with ourselves—as to what are the likely conditions we will have to operate in, what is available in the moment, what gaps exist, and what can be done to address those gaps.
Many wargames and exercises, both classified and unclassified, show how U.S. forces fare under certain conditions in certain geographies. Many bright minds within the government and industry are working on increasing America’s advantages in those scenarios. But that work takes time. Investing in future technologies in the skies, on the water, under the surface, on land, in space, and in cyber are absolute musts. America cannot prevail in future conflicts without these investments. But the United States also needs to be seen as a power that can prevail in the present too. Assessing what can be modified within our existing stockpiles via technology fusion, creative CONOPS usage, and experimentations with advanced manufacturing could keep the enemy guessing and ensure that America and its allies maintain the advantage in the coming years.
