


RONALD REAGAN
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Today in Berlin one can walk down Unter den Linden, the city's broad central avenue, past the American embassy and through the Brandenburg Gate to the spot where Ronald Reagan stood on June 12, 1987.

In that year, someone attempting to make this trip would, even if they could get past the no man's land guarded by armed soldiers in towers without getting shot, still have a twelve-foot high wall in front of them blocking passage through the Brandenburg Gate. The chances of success were not great. At least 140 people died in Berlin trying to cross the wall from East to West between 1961 and 1989 in an effort to reach freedom.¹

Today, the greatest danger for anyone crossing through the Gate and continuing onto Strasse des 17 Juni, the boulevard that stretches into the Tiergarten, is being hit by a careless cyclist or the heavy traffic that now travels across the area where the reviewing stand stood and dignitaries gathered on that day in 1987.

Decades later, the Wall is relegated to the annals of history and reduced in most places to a double line of cobble stones snaking through bustling streets. Berlin, once an island surrounded by one of the most repressive police states ever contrived, is now among the most open, inviting cities in Europe. The city is the capital of a prosperous unified Germany. Visiting Berlin today, one could be forgiven for thinking that it was all preordained.

Reagan and Berlin

On his first trip to Germany in 1978, Reagan visited the site where, sixteen years earlier, 18-year-old Peter Fechter was shot and bled to death in the no man's zone while trying to cross the Wall.² During the visit, the former California Governor and his delegation also ventured into East Berlin and were disturbed by what they saw of life under East German communism. Reagan Advisor Richard Allen notes that this early Berlin visit gave Reagan "a chance to establish firmly his views about the Berlin Wall," and quotes him as saying at the time, "We have to find a way to knock this thing down."³

Yet when Reagan addressed Berliners that summer nine years later, that goal remained a distant dream. Germany was still emphatically divided. Berlin had been scarred by the Wall since 1961. The barrier, originally thought to be a temporary measure, had been expanded and hardened, and controls regarding intra-German travel drove many to desperation. Berliners were separated from family members on the other side. Weeks turned to months and months became years. Decades passed and hope began to fade away.

There were moments of opportunity, but they too came and went. Even before the Wall's construction, East Berliners had risen up in June 1953 until security services cracked down, killing many. In 1956, the Hungarian Uprising was brutally suppressed. In neighboring Czechoslovakia in

¹ "Victims of the Wall," Berlin.de., <https://www.berlin.de/mauer/en/history/victims-of-the-wall/#:~:text=At%20the%20Berlin%20Wall%20alone,both%20East%20and%20West%20who.>

² For more on the circumstances surrounding Fechter's brutal killing, see <https://www.berliner-mauer-gedenkstaette.de/en/1962-300,353,2.html>.

³ Richard Allen, "An Anecdote: Ronald Reagan's Very First Trip to Germany, 1978," Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation & Institute, <https://www.reaganfoundation.org/library-museum/permanent-exhibitions/berlin-wall/behind-the-scenes/richard-allen/>.

1968, liberalizing policies led to optimism across the Soviet bloc, only to be met with tanks as the Soviet Union intervened. Soviet premiers came and went, yet the Wall and the brutal system of repression it protected, remained.

So, in 1987, many Germans likely questioned whether anything would change. Millions of East Germans gave up hope, fleeing to the West. Berlin was not just divided, but West Berlin was also cut off from the rest of West Germany, an island of freedom surrounded on all sides by a police state. The uncertainty and isolation of their daily existence impacted the psychology of Berliners, already known for centuries as hardy, wry characters. Yet this uncertainty masked a deep longing that would be familiar today to those living in divided societies like Taiwan and South Korea, but alien to most Americans.

Many Berliners were not just starting to doubt whether the Wall would fall, they were beginning to question the policies pursued by the United States under Reagan's leadership. The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party two years earlier was being heralded as the potential start of a thaw in East-West relations. Debates over how to respond to the new signals from Moscow were straining the alliance. As John Kornblum, the senior U.S. diplomat in Berlin in 1987 and later U.S. Ambassador to Germany wrote, "In fact, hopes in Germany and in much of Europe on that June day lay not with Ronald Reagan, but with Mikhail Gorbachev."⁴

The Reagan administration was pursuing negotiations with the new Soviet leader but its policy toward the Soviet Union was grounded in a demand that Gorbachev reciprocate through action. Although his own administration was dominated by debates about the appropriate approach to the Soviets,⁵ Reagan's aggressive anti-communism and hard-nosed way of dealing with the Soviets clashed with U.S. allies on the front lines of the conflict.

During the 1970s under Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt, West Germany pursued a policy of "Ostpolitik," emphasizing engagement with the Soviet bloc. Even after the center-right Christian Democrats regained the chancellery in 1982, efforts to extend an olive branch to East German leaders continued. Reagan's decision to couple his engagement of Gorbachev with a continued emphasis on increasing America's military commitment to the allies placed him squarely on one side of this ongoing German debate.

On an earlier trip to Berlin in 1982, Reagan was protested by as many as 100,000 Berliners for his decision to deploy advanced Pershing missiles to Europe. The protests were so significant that they resulted in property destruction and the Secret Service reportedly would not allow Reagan to ride his limousine through the streets of Berlin.⁶ Yet at the end of his 1982 visit, Reagan declared that the trip had given him "renewed optimism about the future of the Western world."⁷

The protesters returned five years later as Reagan stood in front of the Brandenburg Gate. Attendees reportedly could hear their chanting throughout Reagan's remarks. Reagan, apparently irritated by their attempts to disrupt, broke from his prepared remarks at the end to address them directly, "And I would like to say just one thing, and to those who demonstrate so. I wonder if they have ever asked themselves that if they should have the kind of government they apparently seek, no one would ever be able to do what they're doing again."⁸

⁴ John C. Kornblum, "Reagan's Brandenburg Concerto," *The American Interest*, May 1, 2007, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2007/05/01/reagans-brandenburg-concerto/>.

⁵ For more background, see Peter W. Rodman, *Presidential Command*, Alfred A. Knopf, 2009, p. 156-159.

⁶ Kornblum, "Reagan's Brandenburg Concerto."

⁷ Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan in Berlin, Bids Soviet Work for a Safe Europe," *The New York Times*, June 12, 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/12/world/reagan-in-berlin-bids-soviet-work-for-a-safe-europe.html>

⁸ All quotes from Reagan's June 12, 1987 address are taken from "Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin," available at <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-east-west-relations-brandenburg-gate-west-berlin>.

The Speech: Then and Now

The passions driving those protesters were why U.S. officials wanted Reagan to visit Berlin. His team, fearing that the center-right Kohl government might be tempted to offer peace initiatives threatening allied interests in Berlin, hoped that the President could reassure America's German allies and make clear that he was willing to compromise, if the Soviets were willing to reciprocate.⁹

The resulting speech has taken on almost mythical proportions. As Marc Fisher noted in 2017, it has "become shorthand for a version of history in which the U.S. vanquishes what Reagan called the 'evil empire,' with the Great Communicator himself setting the collapse of Soviet communism into motion."¹⁰ James Mann wrote that Reagan's most devoted followers viewed the speech as, "the president spoke, the Soviets quaked, the wall came down."¹¹

While the speech is remembered most for its defiant challenge to Gorbachev to "Tear down this wall," its purpose at the time, a tool of alliance management, is now often overlooked. The speech was mostly ignored in the United States and even in West Germany.¹² It likely had limited impact on the Soviets. Soviet officials, familiar with Reagan's incendiary rhetoric, seemed nonplussed. According to John Kornblum, Gorbachev later reflected that he and Reagan, through their arms control discussions, had begun to build up trust, "By 1987, Ronnie and I were already good friends...I knew Ronnie was not going to let me down."¹³

Despite the lack of attention at the time, the speech fulfilled its purpose. It conveyed a reassuring message to wavering allies and showed the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to the captive audience on the other side of the Wall without the worst outcomes from its most provocative line that were feared by the U.S. bureaucracy.¹⁴ In typical Reaganesque style, it made clear that America was on their side and had not forgotten them.

Two years after Reagan stood on that stage, pictures were broadcast around the world showing Germans standing on top of the Wall that had been his backdrop, celebrating. East and West Berliners met at the Wall for the first time, sharing a drink or taking turns at wielding chisels and sledgehammers to bring down the artificial barrier that had separated them for almost four decades. Four years after the speech, Germans celebrated the unification of two Germanies into one at the site and nearby in front of the same Reichstag that had burned in 1933, leading to Hitler's consolidation of power.

Beyond those with a political bias unwilling to grant Reagan the credit he and his administration deserve for a clear-eyed anti-Soviet policy, there are those who worry that the speech's mythology is dangerous because of the conclusions both democrats and authoritarians have drawn for modern challenges.¹⁵ Yet the world of 2020 is fraught with pessimism and talk of American and democratic

⁹ Kornblum, "Reagan's Brandenburg Concerto."

¹⁰ Marc Fisher, "'Tear Down this Wall': How Reagan's forgotten line became a defining moment," *The Washington Post*, June 12, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/06/12/tear-down-this-wall-how-reagans-forgotten-line-became-a-defining-presidential-moment/>

¹¹ James Mann, "Tear Down That Myth," June 10, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/opinion/10mann.html>.

¹² See Marc Fisher, "'Tear Down this Wall': How Reagan's forgotten line became a defining moment."

¹³ John C. Kornblum, "'Tear Down this Wall' at Thirty," *The American Interest*, June 11, 2017, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/06/11/tear-down-this-wall-at-thirty/>.

¹⁴ The speech also as James Mann notes, played an important role in providing domestic cover for Reagan's outreach to Gorbachev, "The Berlin Wall speech, then, offered cover for Mr. Reagan's diplomacy. It was an anti-Communist speech that helped preserve support for a conservative president seeking to upgrade American relations with the Soviet Union. In political terms, it was the prerequisite for the president's subsequent negotiations. These efforts, in turn, created the vastly more relaxed climate in which the Soviets sat on their hands when the wall came down." James Mann, "Tear Down That Myth."

¹⁵ See Timothy Garton Ash, "The Fall of the Berlin Wall: What it Meant to be There," *The Guardian*, November 6, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/-sp-fall-berlin-wall-what-it-meant-to-be-there>.

decline, not of irrational exuberance about democracies' capabilities or resolve. And no matter how much modern authoritarian controls have evolved from a simple concrete wall, they will not be enough to contain man's inherent desire to be free.

Today democracies are grappling with a new authoritarian challenge, most pressingly the onset of competition with China, but also a revanchist Russia. This comes at a time when some democratic leaders are falling for the allure of the trappings of authoritarian power. Reagan's 1987 address should serve as inspiration and guidebook. Here are several key themes from the speech that are relevant to the challenges America faces today.

Grounded in Allied Interests

In retrospect, a myth of transatlantic unity clouds our understanding of the Cold War. The transatlantic rifts of the present appear to be a stark contrast with the unanimity of the past.

The reality is otherwise. Transatlantic relations for much of the Cold War were a constant exercise in calibration and alliance management, with differing threat perceptions and disagreements across the Atlantic about the best way to respond to the Soviet threat.

Even though he was being protested as he delivered the speech, and despite the disagreements between his administration and some Germans regarding the U.S. approach to the Soviet Union, Reagan's handling of the transatlantic relationship was fundamentally different from the American approach toward Europe of recent years.

Reagan's was based upon an assessment that a strong Germany and a strong Europe were in the interest of the United States. That is what led to the support of the George H.W. Bush administration three years later for German unification at a time when other Western leaders, including British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President Mitterrand, were skeptical.

This dogged support for Germany and the ability of the German people to succeed under pressure, despite the fact that a large segment of the population did not reciprocate, was likely grounded in his ultimate belief in "the will and moral courage of free men and women," as proclaimed in his first inaugural address.

Reagan's was a firm belief that international relations are not a zero-sum proposition, but a system in which values endured across national identity and borders. West Germany's success, which Reagan paid homage to in the speech, was also America's. In an age when nationalism is resurgent, it is worth remembering that whatever the differences over policy, ultimately democracies have more in common than that which divides them.

Celebrated America's Past Successes

It has become common in American politics to criticize the bipartisan foreign policy consensus. Many Americans are frustrated with the outcomes of U.S. foreign policy over recent decades. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans have struggled to find a challenge to unite behind and the protracted post-9/11 conflicts have increased distrust in national security leaders of both parties.

During the Cold War, Americans similarly debated U.S. policy overseas, but there was a deep vein of bipartisan consensus regarding America's Cold War policy that stretched from Harry Truman to President Reagan.

In the speech, President Reagan grounded his remarks in this tradition, noting the actions of his predecessors that contributed to the modern success of Berlin. Reagan's speechwriters reportedly looked closely at Kennedy's own 1963 visit to Berlin and his famous speech. While they did not want to replicate it, they ensured the speech nodded to the love felt for Kennedy in the city. It is worth

noting that the tone of Kennedy's speech, delivered less than two years after the Wall went up, was no less provocative than Reagan's decades later.¹⁶

Reagan placed himself firmly in the tradition of Kennedy's approach to the Cold War and towards Germany in particular, "When President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, freedom was encircled; Berlin was under siege. And today, despite all the pressures upon this city, Berlin stands secure in its liberty. And freedom itself is transforming the globe."

Reagan also mentioned the role played by the Marshall Plan in Germany's recovery, not boasting of America's support, but highlighting how the assistance it provided bolstered freedom and empowered Germans to take the actions necessary to rebuild their country, "The German leaders -- the German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled."

The twenty-four years between Kennedy's speech to captive Berliners and Reagan's address at the Brandenburg Gate were tumultuous ones in American politics. Kennedy was assassinated months later. There was racial strife, leading to the civil rights movement and sweeping changes as America grappled with its failure to live up to the promise of its founding principles. Then came the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the resignation of Richard Nixon. These were just a few of the momentous events of the period, yet there was also a constant – American support for West Germany and the freedom of West Berliners.

Reagan's approach, carefully grounded in the continuity of American policy, is an important reminder that despite the desire for new answers to modern challenges, there are certain constants that never lose their relevance. The dogged determination of all human beings to be free. The power of freedom over repression. The strength of principled patience. All of these were embodied in this bipartisan American approach to Berlin and the Soviet challenge. As Reagan noted, quoting a proclamation spray painted on the Wall that it would one day fall, "Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall, for it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand the truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom."

Principled Negotiation

The core of the speech from a policy perspective was intended to be Reagan's views on arms control negotiations with the Soviets, as it was this issue the Soviets were attempting to use to drive a wedge between the allies.

Reagan responded to these concerns by making clear that his approach was to operate from a position of strength, to show patience and resolve. "Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. Because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth."

Perhaps most importantly, he framed the issue as differences not just about weapons: "our differences are not about weapons but about liberty." This was an important reminder about what differentiated the Soviet Union from those in the West who wanted to see peace.

¹⁶ See in particular, "There are many people in the world who really don't understand, or say they don't, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it permits us to make economic progress. Lass' sie nach Berlin kommen. Let them come to Berlin." John F. Kennedy, "Remarks of President John F. Kennedy at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin, June 26, 1963, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/berlin-w-germany-rudolph-wilde-platz-19630626>.

These are all principles that have been neglected by recent U.S. administrations. U.S. negotiators have been quick to conclude flawed deals, be it with Russia or Iran in the Obama administration or attempts to do so under the Trump administration with North Korea.

The post-1989 American arms control record is a mixed one, with administrations of both parties concluding agreements that have been narrowly limited to progress on weapons reductions but neglecting the belief that our differences are much broader than eliminating weapons stockpiles. These agreements have often left authoritarian actors free to continue to support terrorism and repress their people, immune from U.S. criticism for fear of disrupting the supposed progress made.

Reagan's approach is a better one, as limited agreements do not solve the challenge that regimes based on repression and lies pose to the world and to their own people. As Reagan made clear, deal-making, even with authoritarians, is not impossible, but it must be grounded in principles and moral clarity regarding who is sitting on the other side of the table.

Addressing those Behind the Iron Curtain

Despite the fact that Reagan was speaking to an assembled crowd of thousands of West Berliners, his speech was being broadcast to East Berlin and, as he noted, his advisors had told him that the speech even might reach as far as Moscow via radio.

Reagan understood the importance of speaking directly to those living under oppression. Just days prior to the speech, young East Berliners protested after they were prevented from approaching the Wall to listen to a rock concert in West Berlin. Reagan knew that a message of inclusion was powerful to this East Berlin audience. You are one of us, he told them, "Es gibt nur ein Berlin," [There is only one Berlin].

Reagan was not only addressing those behind him in East Berlin. His message was relevant for all of those living under oppression behind the Iron Curtain who also suffered because of communism's control over their lives. There were many testimonials to the power of Reagan's messages to the oppressed. Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky later wrote of his own experience:

"One day, my Soviet jailers gave me the privilege of reading the latest copy of Pravda. Splashed across the front page was a condemnation of President Reagan for having the temerity to call the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Tapping on walls and talking through toilets, word of Reagan's "provocation" quickly spread through the prison. The dissidents were ecstatic. Finally, the leader of the free world had spoken the truth – a truth that burned inside the heart of each and every one of us."¹⁷

This is another aspect of America's Cold War success that recent American administrations have neglected. President Obama was often accused of ignoring the plight of dissidents and activists from Russia to Iran to Cuba as he pursued negotiations with their rulers. President Trump rarely acknowledged those living under authoritarianism, instead showering their repressive leaders with praise, and refused to even raise human rights concerns privately, let alone defiantly in public.

Despite Germany's return to the stage as a powerful unified economic actor, the Federal Republic today also struggles with how to practice its values through its foreign policy. Short-term economic interests have often meant that from Russia to Iran to China, human rights concerns are secondary, pursued through quiet diplomacy rather than bold proclamations that are inspiring to those living under authoritarian rule.

Democratic leaders today on both sides of the Atlantic should take some inspiration from Reagan's willingness to use his platform to speak directly to those who lack freedom. They should understand

¹⁷ Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy*, PublicAffairs, 2004, p. 138.

the power of their words and remember, as Reagan noted in one of his final public speeches in 1992, the obligation of all freedom-loving people:

“Do not forget those who suffer tyranny and violence. Do not abandon them to the evils of totalitarian rule or democratic neglect. For the freedom we celebrate is not the freedom to starve, or the freedom to languish in a long, starless night of the soul. This, at least, is something that should be beyond debate. Your cause awaits.”¹⁸

Defiant Optimism

Perhaps the most important aspect of the June 1987 address was its optimism and self-assuredness. More than a threat, “Tear down this wall” was a knowing statement that it was only a matter of time before Soviet communism and its satellites collapsed. In debates within the U.S. government in advance of the speech, the line was deemed unrealistic by some who also worried that its defiance would be overly provocative.¹⁹

Yet Reagan, from the first time he reportedly was presented with the speech, embraced it, having uttered similar sentiments in the past. Even as some officials mounted a rearguard action in the final hours before the speech to remove the language, Reagan reportedly told his Deputy Chief of Staff Ken Duberstein on the way to the Berlin Wall that he wanted to keep the language in, “The boys at State are going to kill me,” he said, “but it’s the right thing to do.”²⁰ As George Shultz (who was one of those who argued that the line should be removed), later recounted, Reagan “had the idea that change could happen.”²¹

With authoritarianism on the rise and democracies under threat, democrats in the West today lack Reagan’s confidence and the power inherent in this self-assuredness of purpose. Authoritarians on the other hand realize that their grip on power is fragile. They use tools of oppression, they lash out, but theirs are tools of the weak. Reagan wielded a simple message that exposed their ultimate frailty.

As we enter an age of competition with China and continue to deal with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, we need Reagan’s bold and defiant optimism about our abilities, and the realization that time, ultimately, is on our side.

Meeting Reagan’s Challenge Today

Reagan’s 1987 address should be required reading for American and German leaders today. But are they up to the challenge and the moment in the way that Reagan was?

¹⁸ Ronald Reagan, “Democracy’s Next Battle,” Address to the Oxford Union Society, December 4, 1992, available at https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Urquhart_RelDoc3.pdf.

¹⁹ Much ink has been spilled debating the provenance of the now famous phrase. For the account of Peter Robinson, the primary White House speechwriter, see “‘Tear Down This Wall’: How Top Advisors Opposed Reagan’s Challenge to Gorbachev – But Lost,” Prologue Magazine, Summer 2007, <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2007/summer/berlin.html>. Robinson recounts that the State Department and NSC tried to strip out the key phrase, an account also endorsed by former NSC official Peter W. Rodman, who writes that “to my eternal shame – I was one of those seeking extensive changes to the draft, including deletion of the famous line: ‘Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!’” See Rodman, *Presidential Command*, p. 160. John Kornblum claims that the State Department officials in Berlin also wanted a bold statement regarding the need for the Wall to come down. See his exchange with Peter Robinson about the provenance of the passage in *The American Interest* at <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2007/09/01/letters-to-the-editor/>.

²⁰ See Romesh Ratnesar, “20 Years After ‘Tear Down This Wall,’” *Time*, June 11, 2007, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1631828,00.html>.

²¹ Ratnesar, “20 Years After ‘Tear Down This Wall.’”

Today, segments of the Berlin Wall are dispersed around the world. Its fragments are now treasured souvenirs handed out by German politicians to those fighting for their own freedom, as Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya recently discovered on a visit to Berlin. A statue of Ronald Reagan now stands on the roof of the U.S. embassy, looking out at the Brandenburg Gate, a stone's throw from where Reagan stood in 1987.

A united Germany is now the largest economy in Europe and the continent's natural leader. Yet despite significant progress in its willingness to play a leading role, many German policymakers continue to resist the responsibility that comes with such power. When it comes to standing up to modern-day "Soviets," united Germany often acts much as divided, threatened West Germany did during the Cold War - seeking neutrality or support in theory but not in practice. Meanwhile, many of Europe's smallest countries, cognizant of the lessons of their communist past, are willing to risk much more. This dynamic is not sustainable if European unity is to be maintained and will need to change if Germany is to live up to its potential and to be faithful to its past.

Meanwhile, the United States is wracked by racial strife and political polarization. Over the last four years, transatlantic relations have reached a new low as American solidarity and support for allies has been replaced by America First, which often translates into America alone. The German chancellor has become a political target at President Trump's rallies. This has caused some German political figures to speculate that perhaps Germany's future is as an independent pole in the looming competition between the United States and China, an oversized Switzerland.

Just as the Soviets attempted to take advantage of and exacerbate differences within the alliance during the Cold War, Vladimir Putin's Russia and Xi Jinping's China are attempting to do the same today. The tools of repression are different and more advanced. The ground zero of this conflict is no longer in the heart of Europe, but it is no less threatening to American and German values and prosperity.

The modern-day Berlins, be they Hong Kong, Taipei, Minsk, Kyiv, or Tbilisi, may not be separated from us by a physical wall, but they are no less central to the fate of freedom in the twenty-first century than Berlin was in 1987. Those that threaten their freedom are ultimately acting from a position of weakness, no matter how powerful they may appear. It is only a matter of time before they will have to face the repercussions of their actions. Even during the darkest moments, we should not forget that freedom will prevail.

To paraphrase Reagan, those walls will also fall, for they cannot withstand faith; they cannot withstand the truth. They cannot withstand freedom.