

2026
REAGAN
INSTITUTE
SUMMER
SURVEY



Ronald Reagan
INSTITUTE

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Introduction

President Ronald Reagan believed that U.S. leadership in the world—backed by American strength—was the surest guarantor of peace. As the nation celebrates its 250th birthday, the 2026 Reagan Institute Summer Survey finds that the American people still hold to the core of that conviction. Americans want the United States to lead in the world. They say a strong military is essential to keeping the peace. And they believe that the United States has been a force for good in the world over its 250 years.

This survey also sounds a warning: the bipartisan consensus that has underpinned America’s global leadership is showing signs of polarization. For most of the past decade, Democrats and Republicans differed only modestly on the degree of their belief in an internationalist foreign policy. This year, that has changed. Democratic support for U.S. leadership and for the benefits of American engagement has cooled sharply, while Republican support has held firm. The polarization cuts both ways: on NATO, Republicans have grown more skeptical, while Democratic support has held firm. Americans have not abandoned global leadership, but positions once shared across the aisle are at risk of becoming the domain of one party at a time—depending on who occupies the White House.

Yet this survey also uncovers areas where bipartisan support for U.S. foreign policy goals remains firm. Americans of both parties see the threat from China with remarkable clarity—and increasingly as a danger to their own communities rather than a distant abstraction. Majorities across the political spectrum still believe in America’s moral obligation to stand up for freedom abroad. And younger Americans, despite registering lower concern about many foreign threats, are among the most enthusiastic supporters of U.S. global engagement. The task for today’s leaders is to recognize that the consensus behind American leadership is not self-sustaining—and to make the case for it anew.

Foreign Policy Worldview

America's Global Role

Support for American leadership in the world remains historically strong. A majority (61%) of Americans say it is better for the United States to be more engaged and take the lead in international events, against just 27% who prefer a less engaged, reactive posture. That stands around 20 points above support for internationalism just a few years ago (40-42% from 2021 through 2023). A parallel majority sees the practical value of that leadership: 59% say America's international involvement is, on balance, beneficial for the world.

Younger Americans are especially supportive of U.S. international engagement. Those aged 30-44 show the strongest support (68%), followed closely by those 18-29 (66%), compared with around 55% of those over age 45. Among the youngest adults, that support is especially intense: 43% of those 18-29 strongly favor engagement, the highest share of any age group.

A Democratic Turn Inward


Beneath those topline majorities, however, lies one of the most consequential findings of this survey: support for American international engagement, long a point of relative bipartisan agreement, is beginning to polarize along party lines. In 2019, during President Trump's first term, Democrats favored engagement somewhat more than Republicans, 58% to 48%. By 2021, under President Biden, the two had converged, at 46% each. When support for engagement surged after 2024, it increased in both parties: a year ago, Democrats (65%) and Republicans (69%) were separated by just four points. Through changes of administration and wide swings in the overall numbers, the partisan gap stayed narrow.

This year, that changed. Support for engagement among Democrats fell sharply—from 65% to 55%—even as support among Republicans increased to 71% and among MAGA Republicans to 76%. The gap between parties widened to 16 points in a single year. The share of Democrats who say America's international involvement is beneficial for the world fell from 65% to 49%, while the belief among MAGA Republicans rose from 77% to 81%. The number of Americans calling U.S. involvement harmful to the world jumped from 19% to 33%—a shift driven almost entirely by Democrats, among whom the view nearly doubled from 22% to 43%.

On the question of engagement specifically, a single earlier data point (from May 2024) shows a comparably wide partisan split, but it stands as an outlier against the broader trend. The clearer evidence of polarization lies across the fuller set of worldview questions, where the partisan gaps have widened markedly and in concert: on whether American involvement benefits the world, the gap grew from 11 points to 26 over the past two years, and on whether it benefits the United States, from 15 points to 22.

This is not evidence of a nation retreating from the world; overall support for engagement remains historically high. It is evidence that a foreign policy outlook that once united the parties is becoming increasingly polarized. The parties also diverge sharply on the nature of America's international involvement. Asked whether the United States is better off acting decisively before threats grow or showing restraint lest decisive action create larger problems, two-thirds of Democrats (66%) favor restraint, while majorities of Republicans (64%) and MAGA Republicans (72%) favor decisive action.

Preference for U.S. International Engagement



Defense and the Military


If the consensus on broad U.S. international engagement has frayed, support for peace through strength has not. The Reaganite premise that military strength secures the peace remains a bedrock of American foreign policy public opinion. A supermajority (82%) of Americans agree that a strong U.S. military is essential to maintaining peace and prosperity at home and abroad—a figure that has held within a narrow band of 82-86% in surveys over the last several years. Republicans (90%) and MAGA Republicans (92%) are near-unanimous, and among Democrats the proposition also commands three-quarters support (76%). While strong majorities in every age group agree, the belief deepens with age—rising from 70% among those under 30 to 91% among those over 65.

This survey identifies a public concern about military readiness. Told that the missiles and air-defense interceptors expended against Iran this year could take up to five years to replace—leaving

the United States potentially less prepared to defend itself or its allies in the interim—63% of Americans said it is important that the country expand its domestic capacity to produce military equipment, with just 12% dismissing it. Support tilts right but reaches a majority across the aisle (79% of Republicans, 51% of Democrats). The finding extends a theme of recent Reagan Institute surveys: Americans understand that a credible defense depends on the industrial base that sustains it.

Freedom and Democracy

Amid the partisan divergence elsewhere, the cause of freedom in the world stands out as an area of cross-party convergence. A supermajority (81%) agrees that the United States has a moral obligation to stand up for human rights and democracy in international affairs whenever possible—and there is virtually no partisan gap: 83% of Democrats, 82% of Republicans, and 84% of MAGA Republicans concur. A majority (61%) of Americans say the country would be better off if more nations were free—and



of all partisan groups, MAGA Republicans are the most likely to agree, at 71%. These convictions extend to the instruments of democracy promotion. A majority (60%) of Americans regard funding for programs and organizations that advance freedom and democracy abroad as generally beneficial to U.S. interests, up from 57% a year ago. Support is now even across party lines: an uptick on the right—Republican support climbed from 52% to 60% and MAGA support from 54% to 61%—has closed the gap with Democratic support, at 65%. Forty-two percent overall now say promoting freedom and democracy in authoritarian countries should be a major focus of U.S. foreign policy—up from 29% in June 2023.

Trade and Tariffs

Americans now narrowly oppose the use of tariffs as a tool of foreign policy (50% oppose, 46% support), representing a slight shift from the even

split recorded in June 2025. But the topline masks a deep partisan chasm: 73% of Republicans and 82% of MAGA Republicans support using tariffs, while 74% of Democrats are opposed.

Americans’ verdict on the personal impact of tariffs splits sharply by generation. Overall, 46% say the tariffs imposed over the past year have hurt their own financial situation, against 24% who say they helped. Younger Americans are far less likely to report harm than their older counterparts: just a third (33%) of those under age 45 say the tariffs hurt, compared with 54% of those 45-64 and 58% of those over 65. Younger Americans are also more likely to support the use of tariffs, and opposition grows with age. Nearly half of Americans (48%) think that people in their community or industry will likely lose jobs because of tariffs, a worry far more common among Democrats (61%) than Republicans (38%).

Regional Challenges


China and Taiwan

Of all the regional challenges tested, none unites Americans across party lines more than China. There is bipartisan consensus across most concerns regarding China, from its role in the fentanyl crisis to its human rights abuses. But domestic-facing worries top the list of concerns about China. Americans' single greatest concern is China's role in the flow of fentanyl into the United States (82%). This concern is intensely bipartisan, shared by over 80% of Democrats (85%), Republicans (82%), and MAGA Republicans (88%). Close behind are the Chinese government's ability to spy on American citizens (81%), its purchases of American land (80%), and its theft of technology and unfair trade practices (79%). Each of these domestic concerns outranks the more traditional geopolitical ones: China's military build-up (75%), a potential takeover of Taiwan (74%), and human rights abuses (74%).

That bipartisan concern extends to policy. Two-thirds (66%) say Taiwan's security matters to U.S. security and prosperity, including 72% of Republicans and 62% of Democrats. A majority (59%) says the United States should publicly pressure China to release political prisoners such as Jimmy Lai and Pastor Ezra Jin, even at the cost of increasing bilateral tensions—a view shared evenly across party lines, with 56% of Democrats, 63% of Republicans, and 63% of MAGA Republicans in agreement.

Views of the administration's approach are more divided. In the aftermath of the recent summit between President Trump and General Secretary Xi, a 44% plurality judges the approach about right—including majorities of Republicans (59%) and MAGA Republicans (60%)—while Democrats split, with 37% saying it has not been tough enough and 32% saying it is about right. Just 12% of Americans overall say the administration has been too tough.

Views on Trump Administration's China Policy



A Generational Warning

On nearly every potential concern regarding China, unease climbs steeply with age—younger Americans are markedly less worried than their older counterparts. Across the major China concerns, the youngest adults trail the oldest by 20 to 30 points. The bipartisan consensus on China is real and valuable, but it is aging.

The exceptions are the two concerns most squarely about human rights. Younger and older Americans are essentially even on China's censorship and surveillance within its own borders (73% and 75%), and the gap on its treatment of Hong Kong and the Uyghurs is among the narrowest in this section (64% and 77%). On questions of freedom and human dignity, the generational divide largely disappears—younger Americans are as troubled as their elders.

China Concern	Ages 18-29	Ages 65+	Gap
The Chinese government's censorship, surveillance, and restrictions on free expression within China	73%	75%	2 pts
China's role in the flow of fentanyl entering the United States	68%	92%	24 pts
The Chinese government purchasing land in the United States	68%	93%	25 pts
The Chinese government's influence on American universities and research	64%	84%	20 pts
Human rights violations, including its treatment of Hong Kong and the Uyghurs	64%	77%	13 pts
The Chinese government's ability to spy on American citizens	62%	93%	31 pts
China developing AI technology more advanced than that of the United States	62%	84%	22 pts
Technology theft and unfair trade practices	61%	91%	30 pts
China's military build-up	57%	86%	29 pts
China attempting to take over Taiwan by force	56%	86%	30 pts
China surpassing the United States as the world's biggest economy	55%	77%	22 pts

The Middle East

Iran


The survey reveals a partisan fracture on U.S. policy toward Iran. A slim majority (54%) approves of the U.S. military actions taken against Iran in recent months, but approval is sharply divided along party lines: 81% of Republicans and 89% of MAGA Republicans approve, against just 31% of Democrats, two-thirds of whom disapprove. Approval is highest among those aged 30-44 (65%), lower among those under 30 (53%), and lower still among older Americans (49% among those over 45).

In June 2025—before the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes that month—preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon was an objective nearly every American shared: 84% said it mattered to U.S. security and

prosperity, including 84% of Democrats. Today that figure has fallen to 76% overall, with Democrats driving the decline: Democratic salience dropped 16 points to 68%, while Republican and MAGA salience held near 88%. The importance that Democrats assign to permanently ending Iran’s nuclear program (50%) now trails Republicans (79%) by nearly 30 points. A once-unanimous objective in Iran has become a partisan flashpoint.

On priorities for Iran policy, Americans are more aligned. Bipartisan majorities say it is important to prevent a wider regional war (69% overall, including 65% of Democrats and 76% of Republicans); keep oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz (68% overall, 63% of Democrats and 77% of Republicans); and degrade Iran’s ability to fund Hezbollah and Hamas (62% overall, 76% of Republicans but just 50% of Democrats). Seventy percent of Democrats and 59% of Republicans say it is important to end the conflict quickly even if not every goal is met (64% overall). Notably, a majority across party lines (55% of Democrats, 63% of Republicans, and 67% of MAGA Republicans) rate supporting the Iranian people’s pursuit of freedom and democracy as an important U.S. objective—another sign that Americans want their foreign policy to stand up for their values, not interests alone.

Asked about how the conflict with Iran should end, a majority (52%) favors going after the regime in some form—36% prefer regime change outright and 16% a significantly weakened regime—while just 39% favor a negotiated settlement that leaves Iran’s current government in place and limits its nuclear and missile programs. Republicans are emphatic: roughly seven in ten prefer regime change (50%) or a weakened regime (19%). Democrats prefer a negotiated settlement outright (52%). That preference reflects a broader posture of disengagement: 70% of Democrats rate ending the conflict as quickly as possible an important objective, even if key U.S. goals are not fully achieved—compared with 59% for both Republicans and MAGA Republicans.



Israel

Support for Israel offers another study in broad support narrowing along partisan lines. A majority (65%) of Americans say Israel’s security matters to U.S. security and prosperity—down six points from a year ago. The decline is steepest among Democrats, now at 57% (down nine points), against 75% of Republicans and 80% of MAGA Republicans—a partisan gap of 23 points. On the broader question of Israel’s military actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, 39% now say the United States should do less, up from 26% a year ago—a shift visible across every party and age group.

On sending U.S. weapons to Israel, the public is now narrowly split: 50% support and 46% oppose, with

support down six points from two years ago. Republican support for arming Israel has held steady across the last three Reagan Institute surveys (67%, 68%, 68%), as has support among MAGA Republicans (73%, 72%, 73%). Support among Democrats was consistently much lower—it hovered between 35% and 39% across the last three surveys—while Democratic opposition to arming Israel has grown from 53% in June 2025 to 60% today.

Support for arming Israel is rising among younger Americans and falling among older Americans. For those under 30, support rose from 37% to 44%; for those 30-44, it rose from 46% to 54%; among older Americans, it fell from 51% to 46% among those 45-64 and from 62% to 57% among those 65 and older.

NATO and Ukraine

Americans overall continue to value the transatlantic alliance: 63% hold a favorable view of NATO, consistent with the low-60s ratings recorded in most Reagan Institute surveys since 2018, and 73% say keeping the United States in NATO matters to America’s security and prosperity. But that support now leans Democratic. NATO favorability is at 80% among Democrats but just 52% among Republicans and 48% among MAGA Republicans. Support for withdrawing the United States from NATO has climbed on the right to 63% among MAGA Republicans and 56% among Republicans overall, even as a majority (55%) of Americans continues to oppose withdrawal.

Yet as Republicans sour on the alliance in the abstract, commitment to its core collective defense


principle retains bipartisan majority support. Informed of NATO’s Article V commitment, 72% of Americans say the United States should respond with military force if a NATO ally were attacked—including 76% of Democrats, 71% of Republicans, and 69% of MAGA Republicans.

The case for NATO, when it is actually made, can move even its skeptics. Presented with arguments for continued U.S. commitment to the alliance, majorities of 60-66% find each persuasive, and the effect crosses party lines. Democrats respond most to the argument that NATO deters Russian aggression, while Republicans are most moved by interest-based arguments—that the alliance anchors Arctic security and strengthens America’s own defense industrial base. Strikingly, these same interest-based arguments move even those Americans who say they want to withdraw from NATO.

Argument for U.S. Remaining Committed to NATO	Overall	Democrats	Republicans	Withdrawal Supporters
Arctic security is becoming more important, and most Arctic territory is controlled by NATO allies	65%	65%	70%	68%
NATO allies strengthen America’s defense industrial base, giving the U.S. greater access to military manufacturing, technology, and equipment	66%	67%	69%	68%
After 9/11, NATO invoked its collective defense commitment, and allies supported the United States in Afghanistan	64%	64%	68%	66%
NATO’s presence in Europe deters further Russian aggression	65%	71%	65%	64%
NATO members have recently increased their own defense spending in response to U.S. insistence	60%	63%	63%	60%

Favorable View of NATO

— Overall — Democrats — Republicans



Ukraine

Roughly seven in ten Americans (69%) say the war between Russia and Ukraine matters to U.S. security and prosperity—a bipartisan view, though down modestly from 73% a year ago. Support for sending U.S. weapons to Ukraine stands at 58%, consistent with the high-50s recorded across most Reagan Institute surveys in recent years, but down from a 64% peak in November 2025. The decline is led by Democrats, whose support fell from 75% to 65% since November 2025, while Republican support also fell from 59% to 53% over the same period.

When it comes to how Americans think the war should end, Ukraine’s full territorial liberation remains the single most popular option at 41%, down only slightly from 45% in November 2025 and still well ahead of the alternative options provided. A quarter (25%) favor a lasting ceasefire along current

front lines without formally recognizing Russian control of annexed territory, but about as many (24%) favor Ukraine conceding territory in exchange for a ceasefire with Western security guarantees. The public’s preferred endgame is not capitulation: Americans want the war to end, but not on terms that reward Russian aggression or invite its return.

The Western Hemisphere

In the Western Hemisphere, Americans tend to agree on the strategic ends, but there is partisan division over the means. The clearest example is migration, drug trafficking, and organized crime: 79% of Americans say addressing these challenges in the hemisphere matters to U.S. security and prosperity, including 87% of Republicans and 73% of Democrats. Combating drug-trafficking networks should be a major focus of U.S. foreign policy according to 60% of Americans, including

majorities of both parties (71% of Republicans and 51% of Democrats). There is also bipartisan support for holding authoritarian governments in the hemisphere accountable: 70% support prosecuting Venezuelan officials for narco-terrorism and drug trafficking, and 69% support prosecuting Cuban officials for attacks on Americans and human rights abuses. Support is higher among Republicans (84% in favor on both) but substantial Democratic majorities concur as well (around 60% on each).


The partisan splits open up over coercive means. Using military force to remove the Maduro government in Venezuela wins 58% support overall but only 39% among Democrats, compared with 79% of Republicans. Using military force against the Cuban government draws 52% overall support but just 34% among Democrats, compared with 73% of Republicans.

Territorial Expansion

On recently discussed proposals for territorial expansion, the picture is more nuanced. Support

for pursuing the Panama Canal—framed around protecting a strategic transit route and countering Chinese influence—reached 63%, up eight points in a year. Support for pursuing Greenland rose to 53%, up six points. Democratic support drove much of that movement, climbing 14 points on the Panama Canal and nine on Greenland. Yet the partisan gap remains wide: Republican backing is overwhelming on both (81% on the Panama Canal and 74% on Greenland) while Democratic support, despite its gains, remains a minority view at 49% and 37% respectively.

A new question demonstrates that the public’s enthusiasm for acquisition is conditional on the absence of alternatives. When Greenland is described as the self-governing territory of NATO ally Denmark, and respondents are offered the option of working through existing relationships, support for acquiring Greenland collapses from 53% to 33%. The drop is bipartisan: Republican support falls 22 points, and Democratic support falls 18 points.




The MAGA Movement's Next Generation

The 2026 Reagan Institute Summer Survey tested the narrative that younger members of the MAGA movement are more skeptical of American engagement abroad, commissioning an oversample of self-identified MAGA Republicans under the age of 30. On nearly every measure, young MAGA Republicans hold the same foreign policy views as the movement as a whole: a rejection of isolationism and a commitment to America's leadership role on the global stage. Almost three-quarters (72%) of MAGA Republicans under 30 want the United States to be more engaged and take the lead in international events, against just 19% who prefer to pull back—a margin of nearly four to one. Eighty-five percent agree that a strong military is essential to peace and prosperity. These are not the markings of a generation wanting America to retreat from the world. They are the convictions of a cohort that, like

the rest of the MAGA movement, believes American strength and engagement serve both the nation and the cause of freedom.

On today's most pressing geopolitical challenges, young MAGA Republicans land where the rest of the movement does. On Iran, clear majorities of each group approve of this year's U.S. military actions (73% of those under 30, 89% of all MAGA Republicans), and majorities of each call preventing a nuclear-armed Iran a matter of consequence to American security (75% and 89%, respectively). On Israel, majorities in both groups affirm that the country's security matters to the United States (63% and 80%) and support sending it U.S. weapons (60% and 73%). On China, solid majorities of both share concern about Beijing's military buildup (66% and 85%), its theft of American technology (67%



and 83%), and its role in the flow of fentanyl into the United States (70% and 88%). And on Taiwan, majorities again align: both say the island's security matters (65% and 77%) and worry about a Chinese attempt to seize it by force (63% and 80%). The gap between the two groups is real, but it is an age story, not a MAGA one. Across the survey, younger Americans, regardless of party, register less concern about foreign threats and hold their views less intensely than older Americans. The notable finding is that, even against that generational tendency, majorities of young MAGA Republicans still come down on the side of American leadership abroad.

On alliances, young MAGA Republicans go further still. Young MAGA Republicans view NATO more favorably than MAGA Republicans overall (62% to 48%) and are more likely to say keeping the United States in the alliance matters to American security (70% to 61%). On responding with military force if a NATO ally is attacked—the principle at the heart of the alliance—the two groups are identical, each at 69%.

Younger MAGA Republicans are, however, more cautious about the more forceful instruments of American power and warier of their costs. They are more likely to worry that tariffs could cost jobs close to home (53% versus 35% of all MAGA). And they are more divided over how the United States should meet emerging threats: while a majority of MAGA Republicans overall (72%) say the country is better off acting decisively before threats grow larger, young MAGA Republicans split more narrowly: 52% favor acting decisively, while 45% favor showing restraint, lest decisive action create larger problems down the road—nearly double the 25% of all MAGA who say the same. These are the differences of a cohort weighing the means of leadership, not one questioning whether to lead at all.


America at 250

As the United States marks the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, the public's faith in American exceptionalism endures. A bipartisan majority (73%) believes America has mostly been a force for good over those two and a half centuries, including 82% of Republicans and 69% of Democrats. And 62% of Americans say the description of the United States as a “shining city upon a hill”—the image Reagan made his own—still fits the country today.

That faith is held least firmly by young Americans. A smaller majority (59%) of those under age 30 say the United States has mostly been a force for good, a figure that climbs steadily to 88% among those over age 65; more than one-third (35%) of those under 30 say America has not mostly been a force for good. And yet, the picture is not one of simple generational drift. On the “shining city” ideal, young adults embrace the description as readily as their older counterparts—61% of those under 30 say it fits, virtually identical to the 63% of those over 65. The divide here is partisan: 81% of Republicans say it describes America today, compared with just 48% of Democrats.

The 2026 Reagan Institute Summer Survey thus tells a story of continuity strained by division. The enduring commitments are intact: Americans want their country to lead, believe a strong military secures the peace, see the China challenge with clear eyes, value U.S. alliances, and believe in standing up for freedom abroad. But more than a year into a new administration, the public has grown more cautious—and more partisan—about how, where, and at what cost American power should be exercised. What was recently a bipartisan consensus is at risk of becoming a one-party position, swinging with each election rather than anchoring the nation's role across them.

In a March 1980 address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, President Ronald Reagan argued, “If told the truth, the American people will support a foreign policy reflecting their pride and patriotism, a foreign policy that is a charter for our nation’s great future, not an installment plan for America’s decline.” He understood that public support for a strong and engaged America could never be taken for granted. It had to be explained, renewed, and earned—by leaders of both parties, in every generation. The findings of this survey are, above all, an invitation to that work: to make the case for American leadership not as the program of one party, but as the shared inheritance and shared responsibility of a free people. The consensus is fraying, but it is not lost. The materials for rebuilding it—a public that still believes in strength, in freedom, and in America’s purpose in the world—are plainly here.



Methodology

The Ronald Reagan Institute, the Washington, DC office of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute (RRPFI), sponsored a national public opinion survey, conducted by Beacon Research and Shaw & Company, to assess Americans’ views on a wide array of foreign policy and national security issues. It builds on prior Reagan Institute Summer Surveys and Reagan National Defense Surveys, conducted annually since 2023 and 2018, respectively.

This survey was conducted from May 26-June 3, 2026. The total sample includes 1,555 respondents (margin of error \pm 2.5 points at the 95% confidence level). It relies on a mixed-mode design, with 501 responses collected by live telephone interviewers (cell and landline), 903 interviews from our online panel, and 151 from text-to-web. The telephone portion of the survey is a probability sample, relying on a multi-stage cluster design. Fifty percent of the calls were completed via landline and 50 percent were completed via cell phone. On average, the interviews lasted approximately 20 minutes. To ensure that results accurately reflect the demographics of the country, they were weighted by age/gender, race/region, and education targets drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2023 American Community Survey. The probability sample was then used to calibrate the non-probability online sample (conducted over the same dates) by key demographic and attitudinal variables. Some questions were asked of half the respondents, with an associated margin of error of \pm 4 points. The margin of error for subgroups is larger.

The survey includes an oversample of 331 MAGA Republicans under 30 years of age (the total number is 338 due to the inclusion of a handful of these individuals from the broader poll). The margin of error for this group is \pm 5.0 points.



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