

**RONALD REAGAN AND THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL:
REFLECTIONS FROM YESTERDAY, LESSONS FOR TODAY
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PANEL TITLE: “WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FALL OF THE WALL”

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Kaminski: “I think it is very wonderful to have professor Richard Pipes here who as I was telling him earlier fought two battles. He fought for a couple years when he served on the National Security Council probably fought a battle with the foreign policy establishment and bureaucracy in Washington, but for many, many, many more years he has fought a battle in the American Academy which has questioned his analysis of the true nature of the Russian state, from the Czars through the Soviet Union. I guess it would be wonderful to hear your perspective about how did we go from a situation where I remember in the ‘70’s in Poland we were living in a stagnant and captive Europe, to soon having this paradigm shift from detent to a policy that was intended to have America win the Cold War.”

Pipes: “Thank you. Well, before I address myself to the general question of this panel, if I could suggest a few words about the question which was raised by the previous panel about: ‘whether it was Communism or Russians that were oppressive’, because it is a subject I have occupied myself with virtually my whole professional life. I just want to state an obvious fact that why Communism that is Marxist-Leninism is a European idea. It nowhere in Europe led to Communism. It only led to Communism in Russia and the reason for it is that Russians lack the traditions of Roman law. They lack the traditions of private property and so on; which are so important to maintaining

democracy. It is a fact that I will allude to a little bit later, that Russians are very little socialized and very little politicized and they want a strong government. They want an authoritarian government to protect them from each other and that is why if I am asked who is the oppressor, I will say the Russians. Public opinion polls today reveal it. Public opinion polls conducted show that the majority of Russians attach very little importance to freedom a tremendous amount of importance to authority and to order. We are celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall, and rightly so. This was a symbolic event in the end of the cold war, but I am a professional historian and we professional historians are aware of the complexity of causation. That when things happen they very rarely have just one cause, they have multiple causes; and it is very difficult to decide which cause is decisive. [Indiscernible word] this morning said that if Ronald Reagan were alive and among us today he would deny that he brought down the Soviet Union and ended the Cold War, and I agree with that.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was a very symbolic event. You could photograph it, you could film it. These joyous crowds, coming to the wall; young people hacking at the wall, destroying it. But the events happened a year or so earlier in the rest of Eastern Europe which are not so dramatic. Let me just remind you that Hungary at the end of '88 abolished the prohibition on movement abroad which lead to a lot of East Germans going through Hungary into the West. Poland in June 1989 had elections. I was in Poland a few months ago where they celebrated this. Now, you can't quite film elections quite the way you film the breakdown of a wall, but these were very important events; very important events, critical events, was a change in Russia, in the mind of Gorbachev. Gorbachev came to power in '85, March '85, with the idea of preserving the system, but accelerating it, putting some life into it. And I heard from his closest adviser, Alexander Yakovlev, that by '88, he and Gorbachev decided that the system was not reformable and then they began to open Glasnost, bring in public opinion and have elections for a chamber of deputies and so on; and the whole thing fell apart. These are events which were very complicated and I certainly feel that Reagan contributed greatly to it largely by persuading the Russian leadership that we are here to fight, because after our withdrawal, defeated withdrawal from Vietnam the Russian Leadership believed that we had quit that we had withdrawn into the united

states; we had become isolationists and that the world is theirs. And Reagan showed them this was not so; this was a very important factor but it is only one of the factors that brought down this regime. Now, I was Reagan's Soviet advisor for the first two years of the administration and I was always puzzled by him. I liked him very much and admired him tremendously. He was no intellectual; I think anyone who knew him would admit to that and yet he had some kind of an instinct that told him what was what. He was in some respects rather naïve about Russia. I remember him saying, in private, in a small gathering, that he believed that the poverty of Russia is due to their following Marxist-Leninism and that if they abandoned Marxist-Leninism, if you persuaded them to abandon Marxist-Leninist theory Russia would blossom out. So I had to tell him: 'Mr. President they don't want Russia to be prosperous. The only reason the Soviet leadership can maintain unconditional control of that country is by making the whole population dependent on them; and that means poverty.' It, eventually he got it, but it took time. He was right and the Sovietological Community was wrong. And that is again puzzling. We had hundreds, and more, of people specializing on the Soviet Union, getting enormous grants and traveling through the Soviet Union; and they were all wrong. I recall in the late 1981 I attended a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, which is a professional academic association, as a representative of the Reagan Administration. They jeered me; they thought that I was a crack-pot telling them the Soviet Union was a weak country. They were all persuaded that the Soviet Union was here to stay and that they would adapt themselves to it. They could not understand how a Harvard Professor could hold such wrong ideas. It turns out we had right ideas and they were wrong. I have not seen them apologize for being wrong. [laughter] One professor wrote about me many years later after the Soviet Union collapse: 'yes, Pipes was right for the wrong reasons.' I said, 'better to be wrong for the right reasons, I suppose.' [laughter] If I think about Reagan, for one thing, he had an instinct which is something you're born with like perfect pitch; which tells you what is right and what is wrong, and had a very strong moral sense. And I think that in the end he outsmarted all the Soviet specialists who knew much more than he did, and yet were all wrong, because he had that strong moral sense and believed in freedom and human dignity. That is

something to remember today when we confront also very dangerous, of a different sort, but also very great. I am afraid that I am missing this in the White House today; that moral sense.” [Applause]

Kaminski: “Lee Edwards, you wrote the first biography of Ronald Reagan, you told me, back in 1965, I understand. Where did this instinct come from, and what was it informed by? Was there more than a gut-sense floor for what is right and wrong to Reagan’s world view?”

Edwards: “Well, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, you’re still here. You all must be the hardcore of the Reaganauts. We are certainly most grateful to the Presidential Library here for hosting this magnificent, along with the Heritage Foundation, this wonderful, wonderful, conference. I have to respectfully disagree with my colleague and esteemed professor of History at Harvard. I would say that Ronald Reagan was an intellectual. [applause] That is someone who loves ideas, is comfortable with them and who respects their power. Where came this philosophy, where came this political thought of Ronald Reagan? They came from a lifetime of reading, reflection and analysis. They came from applying the lessons of the past to the problems of the present. And they came from a belief in the power of ideas to change the course of a nation and even the world. I can personally attest to his reading habits. In mid October of 1965 my wife Ann and I, spent two days with Mr. Reagan, then thinking about running for Governor of California and at the end of that second day he took us to his home in Pacific Palisades for iced tea and cookies. While Nancy and he were in the kitchen doing the iced tea and cookies we were seated in the library den and opposite me were the bookshelves. Well, if you are like me you know that is an irresistible opportunity. So I immediately got up, walked over and began looking at the titles; and there were dozens, and dozens, and dozens of books. Books of politics, history and economics; and I recall three titles in particular: one was The Road to Serfdom by Fredric Hayek; one was The Law by Fredric Bostiat; and one was Witness by Whitaker Chambers; and I was stunned because I had never read The Law, by Frederic Bostiat and yet here was this alleged Hollywood actor who had advanced his own thinking. So, here was

the personal library of a thinking reasoning conservative who had arrived at his political philosophy the old fashioned way: one book at a time. Go a little farther, about the political thought, in remarks at the 1981 Conservative Political Action Conference the President listed the intellectual leaders who ‘shaped so much of our thinking. He mentioned Russell Kirk, Hayek again, Henry Hazlitt, Milton Freidman, James Burnham, and Ludwig Von Mises. He singled out one person, one person in particular: Frank Meyer. Probably very few people even know who Frank Meyer was or is, but he was a Senior Editor of the National Review and was the godfather of fusionism. A synthesis of traditional and libertarian thought and that is not surprising because Reagan himself, think about it, was a master fusionist; able to fuse conservatives of all strains and Americans of all parties and no party into a grand governing coalition. Ladies and gentlemen we need that kind of leadership today. Let me just go to some wonderful archival work that Marti and Annelise Anderson, it’s too bad they’re not here today, because what they did by digging into this library and coming up with things like the radio manuscripts is absolutely wonderful. Go back and read those radio manuscripts from 1975 through 1979. You can see there, the ideas, the policies, the programs of his Presidency. For example, ‘the main goal of U.S. foreign policy,’ he once argued in a radio commentary in 1975, ‘should be to defeat communism through such measures as: a strong military and support of the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain.’ In another commentary he used language that anticipated his famous 1982 comment to the British Parliament that Marxism-Leninism was headed for the ash-heap of history. This is what he said in that radio commentary: “Communism is neither an economic nor a political system, it is a form of insanity.” [applause] And then went onto say: ‘a temporary aberration which will one day disappear from the Earth because it is contrary to human nature.’ That is a profound statement ladies and gentlemen. A statement made, written, vetted, researched by Ronald Reagan. Another example, another broadcast Reagan said, “nothing proves the failure of Marxism more than the Soviet Union’s inability to produce weapons for its military ambitions and at the same time provide for their peoples every day.’ His conclusion: ‘maybe there is an answer, we simply do what is morally right stop doing business with them; let their system collapse.’ [applause]

‘Reagan did more than anyone else,’ stated the Russian analyst Leon Aaron, ‘to delegitimize and demoralize the Soviet Union.’ Among those who agreed with that judgment was the Soviet dissident, Natan Sharansky. Mr. Sharansky was in a Siberian prison in early 1983 when his jailers permitted him to read what else, but strangely the latest copy of PRAVDA. And splashed across the front page, Sharansky recalled, was an angry condemnation of Ronald Reagan for calling the Soviet Union an evil empire. Tapping on walls, talking through toilets, the political prisoners spread the word of Reagan’s, so called, provocation. The dissidents were ecstatic. Finally, Sharansky later wrote, the leader of the free world had spoken the truth; a truth that burned inside the heart of each and every one of us. Let me conclude this way: in his farewell address to the American People in January of 1989, President Reagan explained, ‘The men and women of the Reagan Revolution,’ including, I’m sure, all of you, ‘meant to change a nation and instead,’ he said, ‘we change a world, all in all,’ he said, with a twinkle in his eyes, ‘not bad, not bad at all.’ Mr. Reagan was more interested in the success of his ideas than in his securing a place in history. And so in that final message to America he insisted it was not his style, or in the words he used, but in the content. ‘I wasn’t a great communicator,’ he said, ‘but I communicated great things.’ Well, we all know, we all know that he was being much too modest as was his want. He was a great communicator of great and enduring ideas. Like, ‘freedom is the natural right of all peoples.’ An idea so powerful and irresistible, that in November that same year the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and two years later the Soviet Union, the one-time Evil Empire, quietly and permanently disappeared. The power of ideas indeed.

[Applause]

Kaminski: “Well, the 1970’s were not a very happy time on this side of the Iron Curtain, or on the other side of the Iron Curtain. I guess maybe going back to those times soon, but hopefully not. The remarkable thing about the 1970’s, and perhaps the stars aligned, they created or produced not one remarkable leader, but two. We heard a little bit in the previous panel from Lord Powell about the role of Lady Thatcher, but Robin Harris worked in her governments throughout the ‘80’s. It would be great to hear more about, she was also like Ronald Reagan, an unusual person who was not someone you

would expect to rise up to that position. How did that happen and why did they form this incredible partnership?

Harris: “Well, of course, they were quite similar people and that helped. I think that was divine providence as well as just circumstance. I think that to understand why Mrs. Thatcher and Ronald Reagan succeeded in doing what they did, you have to go back, at least, to the 1970’s; you can’t just try to understand it in the 1980’s. The first meeting, as far as I am aware, of Governor Reagan with Mrs. Thatcher was in April 1975 and after that meeting he sent her a note and it reads, or the beginning reads: “I’ve chosen a dark day to write a belated thank you for being so generous with your time on the occasion of our recent visit. The news has just arrived of Saigon’s surrender and somehow the shadows seem to have lengthened.” It is a reminder of just how bad things looked for America; how bad things looked for the West and I want also to dwell on how bad things looked for Britain. Because in 1975 and 1976, straight after becoming leader of the party against great opposition, still facing great opposition from within it, from the ‘Old Guard,’ Mrs. Thatcher delivered two remarkable speeches. The first in 1975 was drafted by that great anti-cold war hero, Bob Conquest, and its main thesis was to question the Helsinki Process and to echo the worries of Soldier Nitzen that in fact Helsinki would legitimize the Soviet system in exchange for, essentially, unverifiable undertakings about human rights. The second speech in 1976, concentrated mainly on the nuclear arsenal, on the naval expansion, and, in general, the military threat posed by the resurgent Soviet Union. Now, the first of these speeches annoyed, profoundly, her cabinet colleagues and the British Press. The Second speech annoyed, profoundly, the apparatchiks of the Soviet Union. And some comic, within the higher reaches of the Red Army, of the Soviet Army, decided they would describe her in the Soviet magazine, called ‘Red Star,’ they would describe her as the ‘Iron Lady.’ This was then reported on the Press Association ticker tapes and seen by Gordon Reece her media advisor; he immediately told her. That evening in her constituency, that was the days when Prime Ministers did still bother about their constituencies, she made a speech, a broadcast speech, in which she repeated that they said that she was the ‘Iron Lady.’ As she reveals in her memoirs, ‘They never did me a

greater favor,' and nor did they. Now, the Soviets, in their tactics, were often thankfully stupid, but the Soviets in their perceptions were often remarkably shrewd. And they had, in fact, understood that they were dealing with a quite different sort of Conservative and a quite different member of the British political class. Now, Mrs. Thatcher was unusual, because like Ronald Reagan, because she was an outsider, because she was a woman, which emphasized, particularly in those days, just how much of an outsider she was. She didn't have any of the social guilt which many of the well-healed Tories of the day did have and she felt no inhibition about attacking socialism both at home and abroad. Indeed her analysis of what was wrong with the Soviet Union was completely, organically connected with what you saw as being wrong with British society and the economy in the 1970's. There was a large difference between Britain and America at that time despite this great closeness that there was between President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher and that was that the British economy was almost, was well on the way to Socialism. We had an enormous public sector, we had the IMF, we were in the grip of militant trade unions and there was a feeling even more than the malaise that Jimmy Carter managed to engender in the United States, there was something much worse and much more sinister that in fact we were en route for some kind of convergence with the Socialist System itself and that this would be the answer to Britain's problems. Indeed, the fashionable way of describing was that Britain was in relative decline and the function of a sensible government was simply to manage that decline. Now, Mrs. Thatcher was what you might call an insurgent against that quisling front and step by step in the '80's above all economically, but also militarily, she reversed Socialism. But, her priorities had, necessarily, to be rather different from America's for one very good reason and that is that what President Reagan had to do in America was to get America back on track to the American way of free-enterprise and individualism. These things had been all but lost from 30 years of particularly poisonous brand of British Socialism in Britain and this explains many of the differences and disagreements that occurred over the years. Well, we've heard about the achievements. We've heard about the defense build-up, which was mainly an American thing. We've heard about the diplomacy. I would just like to end on two points about the diplomacy. Mrs. Thatcher, as Charles Powell

rightly said, she discovered Gorbachev because she had been looking for somebody of that sort. She believed that somebody could come out of a totalitarian system who had himself the ability, not perhaps to overturn that system on his own, but at least be able to perceive the realities of the system and the alternatives. And having discovered Gorbachev, he was then befriended by President Reagan. This does not however, in my view, mean that President Gorbachev was a participant in winning the Cold War. President Gorbachev has an extremely good claim on losing the Cold War peacefully, but that is not quite the same thing as winning it. Another aspect, the final aspect, of diplomacy is this: President Reagan, and Mrs. Thatcher too, their idea of diplomacy was not just dealing with individuals and politics but also dealing with nations. Appealing across the great divide; President Reagan did this. On one particular occasion I think, Mrs. Thatcher's role was very important, and that was in 1988 in her visit to Poland. Where she was mobbed by cheering solidarity: strikers. And here was the 'arch strike-breaking Thatcher' who was hated by the trade unionists as the enemy of the working man being lauded to the skies by the working man. Of course it showed, among other things, that the Poles are a great deal more sensible than the British, but it also shows that President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher got their diplomacy and their judgments of human nature right." [Applause]

Kaminski: "That story shows, too, that Poland had a workers' revolution that happened to be against the Communist state. We hear a lot these days, and this is a reminder that the party that is out of power currently over-relies on hard power, but these stories about Ronald Reagan are a reminder too that soft power; it was pretty good at soft power as well. He led by example, his words carried weight that is incalculable and we heard after the fall of the Soviet Union how important it is what he said. How important it was that Radio Free Europe was being beamed into these countries behind that wall. Of course a year after, I think the end of the Soviet Union, 1993/94 the U.S. Congress decided to slash funding for the RFERL. There was some talk about closing down the station which was then based in Munich. Then Vaclav Havel who was then the President of the Czech Republic said, 'Please don't do this, it was too important for us

and I think it can still play a role.’ So he then donated a building for RFERL in Prague and I think charged \$1 per year in rent, and it happened to be, I believe the former...”

O’Sullivan: “It was the former Communist Parliament.” [Laughter]

Kaminski: “Right, that’s right. And John O’Sullivan is now in Prague and works for, is the Editorial Director at RFERL which is still doing a remarkable job in countries that unfortunately did not catch this wave of democratization. It would be wonderful to hear from you about what we learned, what we can learn from the experience of the Cold War and how it applies now.”

O’Sullivan: “Thank you Matt. Let me just begin by saying what a privilege it is to be present at this conference to be one of such a distinguished panel of speakers, and particularly to be under the patronage of Mrs. Reagan, whom we all honor. Not only for the grace she brought to the post of First Lady, but also because Ronald Reagan could not have achieved what he did without the sure foundation of domestic happiness that she provided. [Applause] It’s also a great pleasure to be back at the library. I came here for the day it opened. You’ve done wonderful things here; I’m astonished and amazed. I am coming back tomorrow. It is great to be back with my old colleagues from the Heritage Foundation, Ed Feulner. I joined it in ‘79 when it had, I think, 5 members of management and about 28 people and budgetary difficulties that we all worried about; though they are happier days now. Well, I want to begin, if I may, by distinguishing between the end of the Cold War and the end of Communism. Because as George Shultz reminded us, I think that the Cold War was actually over when Ronald Reagan left office. The key moment of victory was when the missiles were installed in Europe as he said. I think that the Geneva conference was an attempt on the part of Mr. Gorbachev to end the Cold War on a supposedly, a compromise of equal terms. That failed when, at Reykjavik, Mr. Reagan refused to yield SDI and the following year at the Washington Summit Mr. Gorbachev effectively offered everything he had offered at Reykjavik without the quid pro quo that he had demanded. That was the moment that fundamentally the Cold War was not only ended, or not only won by the United

States, but in a sense the surrender was formal. I think that when we enter 1989 and 1991 we do so with the background that the Cold War is effectively over and done. The end of Communism is something else. Why did it end? I think the answer was really given by Mart Larr in the previous panel. The answer is a psychological one. It ended, in part, because the peoples of the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States no longer felt afraid. It was fear that had kept them in place, subjects or in subjection. The lack of fear meant that they could move towards freedom and overthrow the tyranny that governed them. But there is another side to that as well. In 1988/89 I was the Editor of National Review and I sent the distinguished political theorist from Britain, John Gray, asked him to go to Poland and Central Europe. He came back and told me the following story: He said that someone had told him this joke, 'that there was a competition to recruit members for the Communist Party. If you recruited one you got a holiday on the Black Sea. If you recruited two you were allowed to resign from the Party. If you recruited three you got a certificate saying you'd never been a member.' That not the punch-line. The punch-line is that it was a member of the Polish Communist Central Committee that told him the joke. So there was a complete lack of morale in the Communist countries at this time. It was that lack of morale which enabled the overthrow to be peaceful. I give exactly the credit to Mr. Gorbachev that was given by Robin Harris and also to those people in Poland and Hungary, who yielded in a sense, before the complete collapse of their regimes. But having said that it was the collapse of fear on the one hand and morale on the other that brought about this change. Now, what brought about that lack of fear, that collapse of morale? Well, I think a number of things. One of them has been mentioned; I will claim that I think Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty did an enormous amount. You mentioned, Matt, the tribute that was paid to us by Vaclav Havel. [Likva Wentzger] has paid a similar tribute, and the current Foreign Minister Pole, named Radek Sikorski said to me he owed his entire political education to two things: 'Radio Free Europe and the poor quality of Communist housing,' because his parents listened in the next room but he could hear it through the wall. [Laughter] So I am going to lay claim that we played, or rather my predecessors played a major role. I think it is very important indeed and I think that the American taxpayer should be very proud of what

was accomplished with their money at this time. [Applause] Now, there are other factors too. I will identify three and I'm going to identify those three factors with a particular person. First of all, there was the spread of religious belief and a revival of religion in the Soviet Bloc and that, of course, was sparked, most dramatically, by the election of Pope John Paul II and secondly by his visit in June 1979 to Poland. For the nine days he was in the country he spoke to one third of the Polish people at mass outdoor meetings. Of course, one hundred percent listened to him. When it was over everyone in Poland knew that the Communist regime was a façade and that the bulk of the Polish people wanted national independence and really just liberty. That was not only in Poland but because RFERL broadcast it twenty-four hours a day along with the BBC and others this virus spread to the rest of the Soviet Union. I believe Dick Allen will confirm this: among the people who saw this on television was Ronald Reagan. He later told a friend, 'I think it may well be that religion will turn out to be the Achilles heel of the Soviet Union.' [Applause] So, John Paul II undermined communism spiritually. Mrs. Thatcher, I think, undermined communism's belief in its economic superiority. She took over a country in 1979 that was in the grip of strikes and national decay. Now, I will just add to what Robert said here. It is perfectly true that Jimmy Carter did a great deal to destroy the American economy but he was a mere amateur to thirty years of socialist government. The result is that when Mrs. Thatcher came into power she had an enormous task to revive the animal capitalist spirits of the British people, to get rid of inflation and to establish a sound basis for expansion and recovery. She managed to transform the British economy in the space of a decade into the fourth largest economy in the world. I think it's now about the sixth, but by the time she left office it was the fourth. That told the people in the Soviet Bloc, including their leaders, that all the sacrifices they had made for an allegedly superior economic system had just been outdistanced by one capitalist country that seemed, in 1979, to be the least effective and most inefficient; and that is something she achieved. So, she undermined communism economically. Ronald Reagan, well I don't need to say a great deal about that. He undermined communism in every sense: he outcompeted it militarily, technologically, economically and strategically. Several people now say that communism collapsed and it had these internal contradictions that

made that collapse inevitable. But communism had been in trouble since 1917 and it had never collapsed in this period because we had rushed again and again to prop it up. He was the first President who instead of trying to collaborate with the Soviet Regimes; he was not the first, our Presidents would resist the Soviets, but they didn't see that it was their job to bring about a massive change there. Ronald Reagan actually saw that it was possible for the Soviet Union, in a sense, to be bankrupt into receivership and that is what he achieved. Now, all of these things had an immense impact on the morale of the Soviets. If you look at the diaries of Chernev, you will see that he is as early as 1982, he is speculating the same kind of collapse that was overtaking Polish Communism would overtake Soviet Communism in the next decade. Well, he was one year out, it happened in 1991. The effect of these two things meant that when the end of communism came it came peaceably. All of these factors enabled, in a sense, a peaceful change. If you cast your mind back to 1989 and 1991 you will discover that the educated classes in the West were fearful of what was going to happen. There were tremendous suggestions from very clever, well informed people, that Eastern Europe was going to be overtaken by racism, by border disputes, by attacks on minorities, by anti-Semitism. Well, those things just didn't happen in the way that it was predicted. Why didn't they happen? Well, again I think the answer is impartibly psychological. I'm just going to give a few explanations then I will come to an end. First of all, they didn't happen because the United States led the West, and by leading the West I mean it more or less bullied the West European countries into extending NATO, the opportunity of NATO membership to Eastern and Central Europe, and later the Baltic countries. That meant that all these countries, given the hope of entering the institutions of Western international cooperation, NATO and later the EU that meant that all of those countries were prepared to undertake the hard and difficult tasks of reforming themselves economically and democratically; and they did that, and they did it effectively. The second was the reforms themselves. As Leszek Balcerowicz has pointed out today, those reforms in the main worked, and the more thorough-going free market they were, the more effectively they worked. Of course there was pain and trouble along the way, but at the end of it you had secure economies; you had well-run economies and you had independent democracies. Then,

finally, there is a factor which is the problem. The factor is this: there was a desire to establish new democracies as quickly as possible with as little social upheaval and trouble. There was therefore a willingness not to pursue the communists. Not to go after criminals who tortured people. Not to go after people in government and indeed in some cases to ensure that they continued, particularly in Hungary, to ensure the new regimes included a fair number of the old nomenclature. One element here and one difficulty was that some of the privatizations had resulted in the old communist bosses transforming themselves into new capitalist oligarchs in the matter of a few years. The result was that, psychologically, there was never a feeling that communism had been completely overcome. Its crimes were never been punished. Its former leaders remained in important positions in society. That was bound to produce some ill effects. As I say, I think, on the whole we achieved an enormous amount in the years since 1989, but we left some important problems unsolved. Those important problems have come back to haunt us in the existence of a regime in the Soviet Union, sorry, the regime in Russia, which, is beginning to revive the reputation of Soviet life. Which is going in for a qualified rehabilitation of Stalin; which is, and here it is not me speaking, but the distinguished East European intellectuals who wrote an open letter to the Obama Administration, which again and again disregards international norms in the way it treats the nations around it; which it clearly considers still part of its sphere of influence. In fact, what we now have in Russia, is a regime which does not really accept the post Cold War settlement of 1989 and 1991. It is not overturning it by force but it is undermining it in a whole series of ways, and as Charles Powell said, 'we have to be extremely firm in dealing with this regime.' So, we won psychologically, our settlement was psychologically unsound and we now have a psychological problem. What should we do? Well, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty is now broadcasting to these countries and we are telling the truth about the regimes. We are providing truthful news, we are providing the full range of debate those societies would have if they were free; but that is not enough, obviously, we're an element in it but the West has to rediscover its self-confidence and courage. Its now got to ensure that the former policy of this time, rolling back authoritarianism is undertaken in a new generation. Thank you. [Applause]

Kaminski: “So, I guess merely pressing the restart button won’t be enough?”

O’Sullivan: “Well, it’s a different sort of reset button isn’t it?”

Kaminski: “To our last, before we go to discussion two. Peter Brookes has had a long, distinguished career in government, but he started out as a young naval officer on the ground, or on the sea in the Cold War.”

Brookes: “Thank you very much. There is always this fear being the last panelist on the last panel that everything has been said, but not everybody has said it, but I still think there are a few things to be said; despite all of the wonderful things that have been said today. I think that if it weren’t for the strong, deep, rich national security strategy we had during the Cold War we would not be sitting here today celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall. [Applause] I was a young foot soldier, maybe a foot sailor. I served in Latin America in the mid 1980’s after graduating from the Naval Academy. I went to Russian language school and flew navy reconnaissance missions against the Soviets in the Far East and Southeast Asia; and also I served in the Middle East. I had to go back and look at this because I experienced in that respect and actually look at it from a historical perspective, but I’m not a historian. I was struck about the things I saw, the philosophy behind it; the idea of peace through strength and raising the costs of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Being willing to negotiate, but negotiating from a position of strength. President Reagan, as I recall, didn’t meet with a Soviet leader, a lot of the past...it was a problem that was one of the problems until 1985 when he met with Gorbachev in Geneva. The United States was back then. The economy had turned around, there was moral clarity in our foreign policy and the U.S. military was on the upsurge. I think the other thing he understood is that change comes from pressure, not from appeasement and accommodation. There was this feeling that the United States would not be intimidated and I think these are all things we could use more of today in our foreign policy. [Applause] It was another thing that became the so-called Reagan Doctrine. Now I guess Charles Krauthammer came up with that in about 1985, and I

call it the so-called Reagan Doctrine, but I mean it was so critically important. It was willing to oppose and rollback Soviet influence and expansionism. It went from the defense to the offense. It refuted détente and where that had left us, in a position of inferiority. We saw Grenada in 1983, which I think was the first blow to the strength of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which said that the Soviets would use their military to defend socialist states. It was willing to provide support to anti-communist forces around the world. I mean, I didn't even hear Afghanistan, I don't think, mentioned as of yet. What we did there. Africa, Angola, where I served, in Panama, but in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The support to [sounds like: Saladarnish] and Solidarity in Poland. That the idea after the horrible years the CIA suffered in the 1970's from the Church Commission and from Jimmy Carter and Stansfield Turner. The way they went after and cut back on our operations directorate. The restoration of using covert action and the increase of the intelligence budget, in fact I think the intelligence budget actually went up more than the defense budget during the Reagan years; and that was so critically important because intelligence is the first line of defense. Another thing that isn't talked about much is the willingness to prevent the leak of Western technology to the Soviet Union. We had this advantage in technology and the Soviets wanted to get their hands on it. This is one of the things, and I'll talk about SDI, but they were really worried about military superiority, our military technological superiority, and we took steps to prevent that leakage to the Soviet Union. As a sailor I was very grateful for the fact that they were doing that. Our military renewal, which some might call the military buildup, we looked at a 600 ship navy. 15 carrier battle groups; we're looking at 10 or 11 today. Battleships; our global forward strategy, which I can attest to, was both global and forward. We are out there on the pointy end of the sword. Our Air Force; the B-1 bomber, the revival of the program; the Stealth Bomber, was continued, the development of that and the MX ICBM missile. The Army got the M-1 tank, the Apache and we also moved to light army divisions, which allowed us to deploy more quickly to trouble-spots around the world. The Marine Corp got maritime prepositioning in places like Diego Garcia. But one of the most important things, and one of the things that I felt, was the pride that restored to the American military. [Applause] We got over the Vietnam Hangover. I entered the

Naval Academy in the late 1970's and I saw it there. I saw it in our services. I graduated in the early 1980's; into the Reagan Military and the pride was palpable, the sense we had a commander in chief who believed in us. The fact that he raised our pay and gave us the equipment we needed to fight, if we needed to fight. It made a tremendous difference. Top Gun didn't hurt, but I'll tell 'ya, it was going on well before that time; that pride. I felt that President Reagan, as a young naval officer, that he healed the crisis in the American Spirit; remember Jimmy Carter talking about that? He healed it, I think not only as a nation but he also healed for the American military, which is critically important. And then, of course SDI which had been mentioned several times today. This had a major; a defense program had a major impact on our foreign policy; the strength of our foreign policy. What is more interesting to me in looking at the historical record is that the Russians, in many ways, believed more in it than the Americans did. In fact, I can't quote this quite correctly, but I think the New York Times called it 'projection of fantasy into policy.' Well that's not true today. In fact, that idea is moving in the direction of keeping us safe from the growing threat of ballistic missiles and the weapons of mass destruction they carry. Today we can actually, I remember in the 1990's, when I was a Capitol Hill Staffer and we were talking about missile defense and they were saying 'we'll never be able to hit a bullet with a bullet,' which is basically what you are doing in a missile defense scenario. Today, the technology has come so far that we can actually hit a spot on a bullet with a bullet; and I think it's wrong that we've moved back on Eastern Europe missile defense with this administration. [Applause] The first duty of any American President is to keep the American people safe and that is what Ronald Reagan set out to do; and that is what he did do. SDI had a major impact on foreign policy. The Soviets believed in it and they were also scared to death of it because they were afraid it would lead to other military breakthroughs because of our engineering and scientific capabilities. So, I think we're, the fact that peace through strength and negotiation from a position of strength. A strong national defense is critical to effective diplomacy. We were proactive, we weren't reactive, and the other thing I think that is tremendous is that from day-one the Reagan Team had a plan and they executed it. I think that is critically important to us. There was this constancy to purpose and an unwillingness to

allow us to be intimidated and I think because of these things; because of these lessons we are sitting here today, celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Kaminski: “Thank you Peter. I wanted to back to what Lee Edwards mentioned about Reagan’s ability to force this fusion and create these coalitions. I was reminded of going to these rallies held in Washington, at the AFL-CIO and up on the podium you had Lane Kirkland, ‘Scoop’ Jackson, Jeane Kirkpatrick. Someone had told me that this wasn’t widely publicized, but that Ronald Reagan saw Lane Kirkland, occasionally, for a meal. I wondered how we would manage to create, not a full bi-partisan since it’s obviously...but to carve off parts of the Democratic Party and what might be needed to recreate a bi-partisan consensus today on foreign policy?”

Edwards: “There was a very famous dinner in, I believe it was late ’79, arranged by Dick Allen, I think. Dick, are you still here? Bringing candidate Reagan together with a bunch of intellectuals; Democrats for the most part, former liberals, neo-conservatives, call them what you will. One of them was Jeane Kirkpatrick and they deliberately sat Jeane next to Mr. Reagan. They were going back and forth about foreign policy and national security and so forth. Kirkpatrick was not quite sure how to handle this and here was this conservative Reagan and so forth. Finally, after several minutes, he leaned over and said, ‘that’s alright Jeane I was a Democrat once myself.’” [Laughter]

Pipes: “Can I take issue with Lee on this question whether Reagan was an intellectual? One of the qualities of an intellectual is that he or she gets their ideas from books. If Reagan had gotten his ideas from books he would have become convinced that the Soviet Union is indestructible. He never would have challenged it. Yes, he read books, of course he read books, but he was not an intellectual in the sense that he got his ideas from books. He got them from some other source, which to me is mysterious. I never could quite fathom where he got them from. I think he obviously got his loathing of communism from his experience with communist labor union in Hollywood and that is where he first learned about them lying and cheating and so on. About the Soviet

Union, he did not know very much. Just some instinct told him that this is not only an evil empire but it is a perishable empire and we can destroy it.

Edwards: “Well I don’t want to, this is a temptation I’m gonna have to rebut just a little bit, just one quick rebuttal. Some of you many know this name, there is a gentleman named Lev Dobriansky, who was the author of the captive nations resolution and then head of the national captive nations committee who wrote a book called ‘The Russians are Not Ten Feet Tall.’ He and Ronald Reagan were in communication with each other and Lev Dobriansky was a professor of economics at Georgetown, chairman of the department, so an intellectual. He was able to provide information about Russia, about the Soviet Union, which I knew Mr. Reagan knew about and was part of this synthesis that he went through. Another thing and I’m not saying he was an intellectual like you Dick, who is? But, from 1952 through 1962 when he was working for General Electric he used to take the train from city to city, speaking before General Electric factories because he was afraid to fly; but that changed. When he ran for Governor of California they said, ‘look, you’re gonna have to start flying,’ and he said, ‘okay, I’ll start flying.’ In the ‘50’s and early ‘60’s he took these trains. Train-rides of 10 – 12 – 15 hours, what did he do? His escort officer told me that he read. Now, they weren’t all books, but they were magazines like the Human Events, National Review, and Friedman, the Wall Street Journal and Forbes [Applause & Laughter]; and other magazines. He was taking notes all the time. He was synthesizing all of these ideas. That’s what I mean: he was a self-made intellectual; he wasn’t a trained intellectual who got a graduate degree, but he was, I would argue, respectfully professor, a self-made intellectual. [Applause]

Kaminski: “[Inaudible] wanted to ask Professor Pipes whose many works including Russia have shown the deep authoritarian nature of the Russian state from its founding. Ronald Reagan obviously believed that things can change; he wasn’t a historical determinist. I wonder, do you think there is any hope that Russia can take-on a Western identity; embrace liberal democracy somehow, or are we fated...”

Pipes: “Well, there is hope but you need a process that is extremely prolonged. If Russia ever is going to be a democracy, a country that respects law, that respects civil rights, that respects property rights; it’s a matter of 30 or 40 or 50 years. The polls, I follow very closely the Russian public opinion polls, show that basically they do not trust any government. They think the government has to be strong and protect them, but all governments are crooked. They all consist of liars and crooks who use government to amass fortunes, which indeed has been their experience. They want as little to with it as possible. They are not interested in voting because they do not see any point in it. They don’t think they have any influence on the government. So, you have to change the whole mindset. When I was in Russia in June I was called into the Kremlin by Medvedev’s and Putin’s closest ideological advisor, [sounds like: Redisar Soukopf], and he is a mysterious figure. He is supposed to guide this whole regime with this ideology, and he told me he had read my book, which had been translated into Russian; Russian is the old regime, and he liked it. Now why did he like it? Not for the reason I wrote it. He liked it because it proved that Russia always had autocracy and never had democracy. He said, ‘you see, nothing has changed. That is our tradition.’ So, indeed this is true and I don’t give up hope that Russia will someday be democratic, but I think it will be a very slow process.”

Kaminski: “John you also highlighted the emerging Russian threat as perceived by Central Europe. Is there a crisis of confidence in NATO? Do people in Central Europe still believe that Article 5 still means something; that if anything goes wrong that America will come to their defense.”

O’Sullivan: “The answer is that they are more doubtful of that since the decision not to install the missile defense system in Central Europe than they were before. Plainly the arguments of Germany and others opposing the extension of NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia is another factor in that doubt. In other words, NATO is looking more and more tentative in these regards and consequently the people, particularly the Baltic States who are relying very much on NATO for their defense against a resurgent Russia are increasingly nervous. They are made nervous because NATO has not yet

drawn up any strategic plans, or done any planning for the defense of the Baltic States. So, if you don't even do the planning, how serious are you about your promise? This is a very dangerous development, this spread of doubt about NATO, because it is taking place at the same time as the Russian state, Mr. Putin in particular, and Medvedev in other ways, are making what sound like straight-forward threats. We think of Medvedev as the soft cop compared to Putin's hard cop, but it was Medvedev who gave this address on television that he sent to the Ukrainian President which was as near threatening a sovereign state with unspecified action if they fail to fall into line with Russian policy, as we have seen since 1930's. I think there is this anxiety. Now, of course there is the argument that they used to send in the tanks; now they send in the banks or they send in Gazprom and the Russians obviously are hoping that they can gain many of their objectives through economic pressure and by the use of energy as a political weapon. If you're in Central Europe, and particularly if you're in one of the Baltic States, you can't take that kind of assurance, weak though it is, for granted. So, the West really does have to make some real effort to persuade Central Europe, the Balts, and the Russians that it is serious about maintaining the post-Cold War settlement, and there is no doubt about that. That means serious debate within NATO because we'll have to persuade Germany in particular, to take that line. At the moment it is on the wrong side of the argument."

Kaminski: "Robin, what do you make of the, how would you describe the state of America's alliance with Europe, and particularly the state of the special relationship. I'm sure that Gordon and Sarah Brown really enjoy the DVDs they got from the Obama's, although they can't play them on the British system so they may have to import an American DVD player as well."

Harris: "I think you have to distinguish the properly understood the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom from the other extremely important relationship between the United States and Europe. So, one needs to divide those. On the second, I think that the problem is that American policy, apart from the relatively brief period of the Regan years, has been constantly to encourage the

European Union to become a political and defense entity. In the mistaken belief that Europe was thus going to relieve America of more of the burdens, initially, of defending Europe and then, indeed, of protecting security globally. The Europeans are not going to spend anymore on defense, full stop. You can persuade them and shout and jump up and down, and offer inducement, but they're not going to do it. They're going to spend it on welfare, those who have anymore to spend because of their demographic decline; anyway...I think that American policy is headed full-head in the wrong direction in regards to Europe. As regards to the relationship with the United Kingdom; that is a separate matter. I think that there is and will always be a close relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States for historical, cultural, linguistic and identity grounds. Now this can sound 'airy-Fairy' and of course be under circumstances be 'airy-fairy,' because in the end blood and treasure must be expended if any alliance is worth its name. Still, alliances are based on these deep feelings. In Britain it could easily have happened. The British public opinion would have, say, shifted towards Europe rather than the United States. First of all because of the bad political fallout over Iraq and it could also have happened after the recent financial crisis. It would be quite understandable if the Brits said, 'we want to be part of the Euro and be looked after by the European Bank rather than the Bank of England.' In fact, those have not been the responses at all, and I conclude from that, that the struggle that Mrs. Thatcher began, which was actually to convince the British that they should not go further into Europe; indeed that they should get further out of Europe, is actually pretty healthy. Now what is not healthy is the British economy. You think yours is bad, you come to London. Gordon Brown is a fantasist. He's a fantasist to the extent that he is promising even more public money, and, remember, our public sector borrowing requirement is 12.4% of GDP which is more than when the IMF came in, in 1975-76. He is intent on spending even more public money at the same time as his own treasury, public expenditure plans, are calling for a halving of the budget deficit. Now, this is lunacy. So, until the next election I certainly don't think that much sense can be had out of the special relationship and we'd all better just sit down and wait for what happens in May/June in Britain. I'm not suggesting that things will be all better then but at least then we will be on a real basis. At the moment,

however, I wouldn't be too reliant on anything that the British Government says.

[Laughter & Applause]

Kaminski: "In 1989 we were told that history was ending, in some ways it was born out, apparently, that, 20 years ago 40% of the countries in the world were led by generally elected governments. Now we are up to almost 65%. The new cliché is, 'history's back.' Authoritarian governments seem to be on the rise. What should the American and the Western response be now? How grave is this crawl-back of authoritarianism?"

Pipes: "Well, I sympathize with our promotion of democracy and human rights around the world, but I don't know how realistic it is that we can push this. Ultimately we cannot be the world's policeman. I think we should support countries which do go the democratic way and do defend and protect civil rights, and liberties; but we cannot demand that this be a kind of condition for our having decent relations. We have to have relations with countries who don't do that. I'm afraid that it's not what I like but I'm afraid it's just realistic."

Brookes: "I think we have a, it's critically important to our national security that we support the hopes and aspirations of people to live in liberty. Whether you're talking about Iran, and I think the Obama Administration's reaction to the demonstrators in the streets of Tehran over the past few months has been shameful. I mean, I don't think anybody could have said it better than the demonstrators the other day in Tehran, when the idea of the public demonstration by the government was to condemn the United States on the anniversary of the taking of the U.S. Embassy in 1979; when Iranian demonstrators, who were counter-demonstrators said, 'Mr. Obama, you're either with us, or with them.' I think that says it all. I think the United States; it is in our interest to see people living in liberty. Whether you're talking about China, a quarter of the World's population; whether you're talking about Iran, whether you're talking about North Korea, Burma, Venezuela. I mean, I think it really increases our security because even though we don't always agree on everything I think that we can work better with democratic countries and that will only increase our..."

Pipes: “No, I agree. The way you have a powerful movement in Iran, you should support it, but to impose our ideals in countries that don’t have these movements is [Inaudible].”

O’Sullivan: “Perhaps I could just add to this because I think that both of you are correct. You can’t impose democracy on countries where the conditions don’t allow it. What you can do is give assistance, encouragement to the people who are, themselves, democrats and want to change their societies. For many of the countries we are talking about those numbers are too few to make significant social change in the short term very likely. However, what you can do, and this doesn’t involve armed forces or massive diplomatic policies, what you can do is try to foster, in those countries, the conditions of debate, argument, free discussion, good information, which over a long period of time, along with such factors as the spread of property rights brings about a change in the society in the direction of democracy. Now, in effect, that is what international broadcasting by the World Service at the BBC, by RFERL and others does. It essentially tells those societies: ‘Look, this is how people behave in advance, civilized, democratic societies. They debate, they argue, they discuss, they do so openly and clearly, they don’t try to kill their opponents; and furthermore they do so on the basis of good information.’ Now, you can argue ‘it takes a long time.’ Yes, it does take a long time, but is actually a more sure road to improving things than anything else. In the case, for example, of Iran there is no doubt that Radio Farda, our service, has had a big impact in telling people what exactly has been going on and breaking the monopoly over information that the regime would otherwise have. The regime demonstrates that this is true by trying, with all of their might and mane to jam us and block our reception through the internet. An example slightly more advanced is what has happened recently in Moldova. The communists tried to get away with stealing an election, there were riots, we reported these things very vigorously, we spread the information through the society and there has since been a second election which has brought to power another government. I am not saying everything in the garden is rosy by any means yet; there is still a political struggle going on there, but because free media was available through RFERL and the BBC that autocrats, in this case the

communist autocrats were not able to get away with stealing an election. The people basically were kept informed and the whole thing was blocked. So, something can be done, but be warned: it's a long business."

Kaminski: "Just quickly, if I could get some words and then I can take some questions from the floor since you've all been so wonderful to stay till the end."

Edwards: "Just a quick comment that it is possible for non-governmental organizations to make a difference. It so happens that the group I am associated with started an online, global museum on communism, some three months ago. We look at communism from Karl Marx to the present and the five communist countries that still exist today."

Audience: "What's the website?"

Edwards: "It's called 'global-museum-on-communism.org,' I thought you'd never ask. I know it's a long thing 'global-museum-on-communism.org,' say it three times. It must be a good site because our esteemed colleague and scholar who wrote our essay on the Soviet Union under communism was Richard Pipes. It is a terrific essay; he sums up what it was like in just 2,000 words. Already we've had 50,000 hits, 50,000 visitors I should say who have visited our site from all over the world. Including from Europe; including from China. So there are things that can be done by non-governmental organizations as well. Thank you." [Applause]

Kaminski: "Some questions, please."

Question: "Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen; and good afternoon panelists. Thank you very much for this opportunity to be here today. My name is Lee [Sounds like: Ojo], I traveled all the way from New York, and what I want to say is... [Applause] thank you. What I want to say is, I grew up in China and President Reagan, actually, partially inspired me for seeking opportunity after my college graduation for a scholarship here. That is how I immigrated and settled down; and am now in the

process of naturalization. [Applause] Thank you. One thing I want to say is, especially Mr. O'Sullivan he mentioned such a great point, that during Mr. Reagan's time I remember one thing clearly; maybe many of you aren't familiar with. Mr. Reagan raised a great idea which is peaceful evolution to those people still not joining in the freedom. Like China, like former East European Countries, and obviously the former Soviet Union. That was a great impact to us that was my early teenage years, and many of my college students and schoolmates what we heard about peaceful evolution, we started to think about, 'this world can be different.' However, the communist regime, labeled President Reagan as a hat of an evil capitalist empire; which is eroding our country, eroding our socialism and eroding our communism. Well, history tells the truth. Twenty years later we understand what is better for us. So to conclude, the Cold War has been ended however the communism has not. The largest population in the world is in China, underground Christians, Fou Lon Gong practitioners..."

Kaminski: "The question?"

Question: "Many of them are still. I think we have a great cause to work together closely. Thank you very much."

Kaminski: "John, would you like to talk about how peaceful evolution can be applied to the...China."

O'Sullivan: "It's not really a question. I think that you gave a strong and interesting account. Let me say, that I wouldn't, myself, today describe the Chinese regime as communist. It's a dictatorship of the communist party, but the communist party long ago abandoned any sort or claim to Marxist-Leninism or communist policy. What it is, is an authoritarian nationalist regime which has not really got an effective doctrine justifying its power. Now, it's providing people, at the moment, with considerable economic freedom and some prosperity. That will go a long way, as it did in Hungary, to keep them in power. At the same time, in my view, they are essentially an unstable regime, they don't have a justifying ideology that they can defend to the rest of the

world, and if they cease to deliver prosperity, and all regimes at some point cease to deliver prosperity, they are going to be in very serious trouble. I hope this does not mean that the evolution towards a freer society will be un-peaceful; I hope it doesn't mean it will be bloody. I can't guarantee that, all I can say is that I think that the Chinese are in a position of being half slave and half free. We have to tell the truth about that while at the same time not taking action that will be making life more difficult for the dissidents."

Kaminski: "I could take two more questions, and take them in succession."

Question: "You spoke about the special relationship between Britain and the United States; yet I've seemed to notice a shift. Britain released a Libyan terrorist that had killed an immense amount of Americans in a plane-crash over Lockerbie, Scotland. I wonder whether or not that is a harbinger of the increasing Muslim population in Europe and whether that increasing Muslim population will cause a shift away from the United States in both Britain and Europe; and more toward the third world, especially toward the Muslim world."

Harris: "Well, I think the reason why this man was let go, at Quebec, was in a word greed because of the hope for useful trade deals with Libya. I have no doubt whatsoever. I don't think it's a matter of sympathy with Islam or because of large groups of Muslims in British society. It was a wrong decision and should not have been made. I should also say that of course, getting close to General Gaddafi is not just British policy. It actually began; I think it probably began, well I think it was probably equally a policy of the United States and of Britain. I, personally, am against it. I was actually political advisor at the Home Officer at the time the young police woman called WPC Fletcher was murdered, and shot from the so-called Libyan Peoples' Bureau. It's long enough ago to say that I believed and advised, that it was pretty clear who had done it but of course, you needed to find the weapon in order to make the prosecution successful. I thought that, actually, that the various Geneva Conventions and other should have been breached in order to have gained this, to bring this woman's murderer to justice.

Well that wasn't done, and I understand why it wasn't done, but I certainly think that if you start to try and get close to people like Gaddafi then you are going to be led down a road which leads to iniquitous decisions like you have talked about. There is a wider problem which is the very large numbers of Muslims who have come to settle in Britain. Now, I don't want you to get me wrong, there is nothing wrong with Muslims settling in Britain. The problem is that with uncontrolled immigration, in very, very large communities where there is either a Sharia Law or at least something approaching it, it is extremely difficult to monitor the small minority who are extremists and might well be used by Al-Qaeda and other sources abroad. But, I think these are two separate questions."

Kaminski: "One more question and then we have to wrap-it-up. Please, in the back."

Question 2: "Richard Allen spoke a little bit at the beginning about taking credit. This isn't a case of being boastful. To me it is a case of that we have to accept what we accomplished. The Reagan-Thatcher Revolution accomplished a great deal. The Carter-Obama administration has had tremendous failures. If there is a Noble-type Prize, when are we going to have a Reagan Freedom Award?" [Applause]

Pipes: "Well, I can say that last month I got the Truman-Reagan Freedom Award in Washington from my friend here, Lee Edwards. So it exists."

Kaminski: "I think we have to wrap-up now. Thank you very much for this wonderful event; thanks to you."

Heubusch: "Thank you all so much for coming. Thank to our just absolutely terrific panelists and our moderator. On behalf of Mrs. Reagan at the Reagan Foundation and Ed Fullner at the Heritage Foundation, we so much appreciate you coming. Have safe travels. The museum is still open till seven, if you want to take a look around."